AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application No. 20490/92 by ISKCON and 8 Others against the United Kingdom The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 8 March 1994, the following members being present: MM. A. WEITZEL, President C.L. ROZAKIS F. ERMACORA E. BUSUTTIL A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK Mrs. J. LIDDY MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ B. MARXER G.B. REFFI B. CONFORTI N. BRATZA I. BÉKÉS E. KONSTANTINOV Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the application introduced on 24 April 1992 by ISKCON and 8 Others against the United Kingdom and registered on 13 August 1992 under file No. 20490/92; Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having regard to : - reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; - the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 3 June 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 13 September 1993; - the further information submitted by the applicants on 16 February and 7 March 1994; Having deliberated; Decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicants are the International Society for Krishna Consciousness Ltd. ("ISKCON") and eight individuals who are members and, in part, officers of ISKCON. The applicants are represented by Mr. S. Ruparell, solicitor, of Messrs. Singh and Ruparell, solicitors, London. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. ISKCON acquired a 19th century manor in 1973. The local authority had confirmed, by letter of 27 March 1973, that "on the information available the last use of the premises, namely a nurses' residential college, falls squarely within the same use class as a residential theological college in connection with the promotion of the religion of Krishna Consciousness. In the circumstances, planning permission is not required. Although the previous use was largely residential, I gather that it was also partly educational and this appears to be the situation with the use now proposed". On 25 January 1983 ISKCON entered into an agreement ("the Section 52 Agreement") with the local authority that, inter alia, ISKCON would not permit more than 1,000 persons to visit the manor on any one day except with the consent of the council; the council granted consent for more than 1,000 persons to be present on six days in the year (festival days), subject to various conditions. The agreement referred to a previous enforcement notice which had been served in 1981 and against which ISKCON had appealed, and was expressed to be without prejudice to the council's rights to serve further enforcement notices. The council withdrew the existing enforcement notice, and ISKCON agreed not to make any claim for costs in the appeal. On 8 January 1987 the local authority served an enforcement notice on ISKCON alleging that, by using the land for "the purposes of a residential educational college and a religious community and public worship and public entertainment in connection with religious festivals" ISKCON had materially changed the use of the land, and that this material change of use amounted to a breach of planning control. In the annex to the enforcement notice the local authority referred to the Section 52 Agreement, and alleged that, following repeated complaints from the local residents, the local authority had been made aware that the number of persons attending on non-festival days was increasing and had exceeded the 1,000 person limit. An Inspector held an inquiry into appeals by ISKCON against the enforcement notice (and related matters). The inquiry was held on 9 November 1987, 21 November 1988, 29 November to 2 December, 6 to 9 December, 14 and 19 to 21 December 1988. In the 136 page report of the inquiry the Inspector found, as matters of fact, as follows: "B. Religious and Social 1. The Krishna Consciousness movement, a traditionalist branch of the Hindu faith, was founded by Srila Prabhupada, a sanskrit scholar who emigrated to New York from India, in 1966. Its aim is to stimulate interest and convert people world-wide to the spiritual principles of the Vedic culture of India as expounded in the scriptures of the Bhagavad Gita (The Bible of India). There are now 200 ISKCON centres throughout the world. 2. Devotees of Krishna Consciousness regard it not just as a religion, but as a whole way of life, constantly developing their love of god by rendering devotional service ("Shakti-Yoga"). This includes the purification of the consciousness by constant chanting of the Holy Names of God. (The Hare Krishna Mantra). 3. Other forms of devotion regularly practised are the study of the scriptures, guided by priests and teachers, the performance of "puja" or acts of devotion to the deities at a shrine or at home, the offering of sanctified food to the deity before eating, "prasad", and pilgrimages to a shrine or "tirtha" on holy days and festivals. 4. On these occasions it is customary to take "Darshan" or audience of the deities and offer silent private prayers as well as participating in the services performed by the priest, "Arati", and taking part in congregational chanting. 5. Any Hindu shrine contains deities which are regarded as gods themselves in the form of wood or stone. The deities at the Manor are of marble statues, worthy of the highest veneration. 6. Hindu tradition demands that they be moved only to achieve significantly better facilities for worship within their existing "dharma" or area over which they have exercised their influence. Any other move would be an act of desecration. 7. The first ISKCON shrine was set up in London in 1969 in a rented flat in Bury Place, and deities were installed there. In 1979, following enforcement proceedings and subsequent litigation, that temple and the deities were moved to premises in Soho Street, London, where ISKCON still have a temple with deities and resident priests, and a similar type of worship to that at the Manor. 8. Devotees of Krishna Consciousness are required to observe the "regulative principles", strict rules as to diet and temperance. Single persons live a monastic existence. The movement has a strong social conscience and tradition of counselling the distressed and afflicted. 9. The current Hindu population of Britain is estimated at 750,000 with between 120,000 and 200,000 in North London, 55,000 of these being within Brent and Harrow and forming the main catchment area for the temple congregations. 10. There are few Hindu temples in London, compared with Birmingham, which has 4 to serve a population of 40,000. Those in north-west London serve mainly the Swaminarayan faith, whose followers do not worship Radha and Krishna. C. The Function of the Manor 1. The Manor is said to be the only "Math", or training college for Hindu priests in the United Kingdom. It welcomed as students anyone who wished to devote all or part of their lives to the understanding of the faith and devotion to Krishna. ... 4. It is a "Tirtha" or place of pilgrimage. Coachloads come from Birmingham to worship at the Manor. ... 6. The shrine is essential to the teaching of priests, regardless of any public worship. ... 8. The following are the principal activities at the Manor: a. A residence (Ashram) for between 40 and 50 single devotees, priests and novices. b. A centre for the training of full time Hindu priests and missionaries. ... i. Devotional services in the temple between 0430 and 2115 hrs. daily, with extended programmes on Sundays, to which all members of the public are free to come. ... l. The conduct of one or two day festivals on the 3 most important festivals in the Hindu calendar, namely Ramnavani (April), Janmasthnmi (July-September), Diwali (October- November), and other minor festivals on less important holy days." In Section D of his Report the Inspector set out the history of the events leading up to the service of the enforcement notice, the material part of which may be summarised as follows: (1) In 1974 a neighbouring resident complained about large numbers of people living at the Manor, and services being advertised. A newspaper article in the summer of 1974 referred to 1,000 people celebrating Krishna's birthday at the Manor. A weekend festival in August 1975 attracted 5,000 visitors on each day and further festivals in November 1975 and August 1976 attracted not more than 2,500 people in any one day. Parking on neighbouring fields ameliorated adverse effects on he village. (2) On 30 May 1978 planning permission was granted for the construction of a car park with 127 spaces. The application had been made at the request of the planning authority. The work was completed in 1979 at a cost of £20,000. (3) A newspaper article in August 1979 reported a forecasted attendance of 10,000 people for the Janmasthami festival. A resident reported 600-800 cars parked in the fields and 11 coaches being parked in lay-byes in the area on Sunday 12 August. (4) The 1980 Janmasthami festival was held on Saturday/Sunday 31 August after notification had been given that it would be on the Sunday and Monday. It was estimated that 14,000 people had attended each day and 15,000 attended a separate evening festival on Tuesday 2 September, when traffic blocked the village for several hours. By 1980 the Manor had become generally known as "The Temple". Counts carried out by Mr Jeffers in September 1980 indicated that on 3 successive Sundays between 498 and 760 vehicles entered the Manor with a flow of through traffic through the village of between 841 and 1,161 vehicles. in the same period. At the same time between 1,127 and 1,502 persons were counted into the Manor. Further counts on 4 Sundays in October 1980 showed between 587 and 1,119 persons entering the Manor. (5) In July 1984 ISKCON sold their Worcestershire property, Croome Court, for economic reasons. (6) A handbill inviting visitors to the Janmasthami Festival on 8 September 1985 stated that coach parties should write to the Manor in advance. It also said that every Sunday a special Festival programme was held from 4 pm to 9 pm featuring dramas, video shows, lectures, children's classes. Full Prasad, Bhajans (congregational chanting) and Arati (temple services)). It was estimated that 13,000 people attended, over 2 days. (7) Counts carried out from September 1985 to September 1988 showed that there have regularly been more than 1,000 visitors to the Manor on non-festival Sundays, the average attendance being in the region of 1,500. The 1986 Janmasthami Festival attracted 1,184 vehicles on Sunday 24 August, 682 on Monday 25 August and 1,955 on Wednesday 27 August, with visitors counted at 4,631, 2,339 and 8,781 on those 3 days. A nearby resident described the Festival as seeming to go on all the week and having only 21/2 hours sleep on one night. (8) Previous proposals for a residential farm community in the Midlands and community halls in areas where the Hindu population were concentrated, such as Brent, Southall and East London had not materialised. Following the initial adjournment of the Inquiry into the Enforcement Notice appeal a search was made for an alternative temple site and that at Dagger Lane was identified. ISKCON indicated they required a site 3 times the site of that at the Manor, and the buildings proposed would cover about 21/2 times the floor area. The deities would be moved to the new temple and the Manor would become primarily a place of spiritual retreat with a shrine for the benefit mainly of residents who would number up to 50. In Section E of his Report the Inspector found that the main house was a Grade II listed building (having been added to the list in 1985) and the buildings and most of the grounds were within the Letchmore Heath Conservation Area, designated in 1969. The site was within an extensive area of the Metropolitan Green Belt and this notation had not changed since 1954. Whilst stating that the legal implications of these facts were matters for the Secretary of State, the Inspector set out in detail the conclusions which he had drawn from the above facts. The Inspector noted that it was quite clear that the notice was aimed at discontinuing all festivals, and that there was no intention to include any saving for the 6 days mentioned in the Section 52 Agreement. The Inspector did not consider there was any necessity for it to do this. He concluded that the enforcement notice was valid and that the appeal failed on each of the grounds relied on by ISKCON. As to Ground (c) (the appeal on the ground that the breach of planning control had not taken place), the Inspector found on the evidence that residents at the Manor lived as a community, in a regime somewhat similar to a monastery, devoted single mindedly to the service and promotion of their religion. The bond between all the occupants of the Manor was the religion of Krishna Consciousness, and they worked and ate together, and shared the house and its grounds, each resident having only a part of a shared bedroom for his or her sole occupation. That is communal living as the reasonable man would understand it. As to public worship, the public were permitted to attend services at all times. The Manor was proud to keep open house, and the gates were locked only for a few hours during part of the night. No visitor had to ask for any permission to enter. The services in the temple were conducted on exactly the same basis as in an Anglican or any other church, although there was no parish roll or register of communicants. Members of the public were invited to celebrate weddings, with a religious ceremony after the civil one, and this also could be described as an element of public worship. As to public entertainment in connection with religious festivals, the publicity given in the past, and attractions promised at the festivals, with references to firework displays, vegetarian feasting, spectacular pandal performances, dances, drama and music and video shows indicated that the visitors did indeed come not just to worship in the temple or offer silent prayers to the deities, but also to be entertained, albeit against a religious background. The festivals had many of the attractions of a fête, and more besides. As to Ground (b) (the appeal on the ground that the matters alleged did not breach planning control), the Inspector concluded that the primary use of the Manor was fundamentally different in many ways from a residential theological college and that there had been a material change of use. It was the practice at the Manor to extend open doors to all comers at almost all hours of the day and night in a way which no college would do, and which would not be found at any church, even a major cathedral in a city. It was, as one resident wrote "rather like having Canterbury Cathedral in the middle of a small English village". The Inspector expressly considered ISKCON's argument that the effect of the Section 52 Agreement was to found an estoppel. He noted that it was an agreement under seal voluntarily entered into and as such the law of contract applied. Furthermore the recital (viii) clearly implied that the parties envisaged that some further enforcement notice might be served if it was deemed expedient. It was in any event clear from the authority cited that a planning authority could not by virtue of a Section 52 Agreement fetter its discretion to carry out its statutory function to serve another enforcement notice in the future. The rights and duties of the parties conferred by the Section 52 Agreement should be determined by the law of contract, the enforcement notice according to the statutory provisions. The existence of the Section 52 Agreement did not estop the planning authority from serving the enforcement notice and the Section 52 Agreement had no bearing on the Ground b. appeal, which failed. As to Ground (a) (the ground of appeal that planning permission ought to be granted), the Inspector summarised the primary issues, which were in his view all of equal relevance in setting out the conflicting priorities. These included: "vi. Does the importance of the Manor as a shrine and the need to provide places of worship for the Hindu population:- a. constitute those very special circumstances which justify development in the Green Belt in any event; b. outweigh any specific and convincing planning objections on any of the grounds noted above and justify an exception to Green Belt and other Development Plan policies? vii. Whether, given the long history, the presumption in favour of development and the previous decisions by the planning authority, any injury to amenity can be met by suitable and enforceable conditions." The Inspector's conclusions on these issues were as follows: "37.13 I turn next to issue (vi), very special circumstances. I accept that the Manor has become a special place of worship and pilgrimage for the Hindu community in this country, and that there appear to be very few Hindu places of worship in North London and nearby counties. The Manor is of special importance as the home in Britain of ISKCON's founder. I do not doubt that the traditional religious rites and ceremonies, in sylvan surroundings, bring inspiration and spiritual comfort to many who visit. No one could ignore the national and international concern, and the social issue posed by the possibility of restricting participation in the worship at the Manor and the celebration of the Hindu festivals. Whilst I have not adopted verbatim the findings of fact suggested by Counsel for the appellants in respect of the planning authority's attitude of partial acceptance over the years, I accept the basic thesis behind them, and indeed they are largely borne out by the planning authority's own evidence. 37.14 The appeal of Krishna Consciousness and the Hindu population have both increased substantially in the past 15 years. It is very clear from the voluminous documents that regular attendances at the Manor over and above those at festival times have also increased significantly in recent years. The Manor has become an important place of worship and pilgrimage. This is unfortunate in view of the fact that it is situated in one of the most vulnerable areas of Green Belt, so very close to London, in a village of high profile public activities. The sale of Croome Court and concentration of activities at the Manor seems to have flown in the face of those constraints which should have been obvious in view of the history of concern by the planning authority through the 1970s. 37.15 I take due note that the Manor has been allowed to be used for public worship and public entertainment at festivals for many years. I do not consider however that this implies toleration of the status quo, but rather that the planning authority have been doing everything they can to avoid the confrontation which the present enforcement notice has provoked. I note that some residents accept that they have had less to complain about from noise and disturbance in recent years, but it is in the nature of things that uses which have caused conflict are toned down when there are enforcement proceedings pending. When I bear in mind the numbers of people and vehicles involved, and the type of activities, such as weddings and feasts which have been publicised in the past, I have to take into account that a planning permission for a use which is geared to attracting people is very likely to result in an upsurge of activity. 37.16 The appellants maintain that because the earlier enforcement notice and the Section 52 Agreement provided for a tolerance of up to 1000 visitors on non-festival days, this figure at any rate should be regarded as acceptable in planning terms. By the same token they imply that the 6 Festivals should be accepted. I do not consider this should necessarily be so. A figure of 1000 visitors, particularly if it is to be regarded as 1000 visitors in addition to the staff and students whose attendance is part and parcel of the determined use of a theological college, is to my view too large a crowd to bring into the village in any event on a Sunday. Taking Mr Campbell's occupancy of 3.85 occupants per car, which seems surprisingly high, it will still generate some 260 in and out vehicle movements, which will certainly have a considerable effect on the Sunday evening peace and quiet for the nearest residents. I conclude therefore that there is no justification for taking 1000 visitors as an acceptable norm. 37.17 I am in no doubt that any church of any faith or denomination in a small village or indeed in any closely built residential area, which regularly attracted 1000-1500 people for late evening services on Sundays, and crowds of up to 12000 for festivals 3 times a year, would encounter objections from the host community. The intimate small scale closely built character of a home counties village simply cannot accommodate the crowds attracted to a tirtha in the Indian sub-continent, especially when most of the worshippers or pilgrims have to come in their own private transport or in coaches. When religious meetings on this scale are held in the United Kingdom such as those by Billy Graham and other evangelists, Earls Court or Wembley Stadium are booked. I note that Mr Sharman proposes to hold the next Hindu youth festival in such place, acknowledging that the temple premises in Wandsworth are not large enough. 37.18 It also seems to me that the fact that the tenets of Krishna Consciousness prescribe that there must be devotions virtually 24 hours a day, with comings and goings very late at night, are particularly intrusive in a small village. The appellants are not prepared to even consider curbing their night time activities and maintain that it would be contrary to their faith to do so. I understand what they say, but this inevitably makes the use very difficult to fit into a residential village where most people travel some distance to work, and come home expecting a measure of peace and quiet, essentially at weekends when the use of the Manor is at its most active. 37.19 I take due note of the very large number of letters and petitions, addressed to HM the Queen, the Prime Minister and members of HM Government, Members of Parliament, the planning authority and myself relating to this matter. Unfortunately many of these are based on the premise that there is some antipathy to the Hindu religion, which is not the case. Inevitably many of these letters come from people far away from Letchmore Heath who are not aware of the full circumstances and the problems posed by the attraction of crowds into a small English village. I take particular note however that there are also some letters from local residents supporting the appellants, and there was some support for the alternative access, if that had proved a practical proposition. 37.20 In his submissions counsel for the appellants expressly withdrew any allegations of religious or racial prejudice which had been made against the planning authority. In this, as in very many other planning decisions it is necessary to weigh the needs of one group or interest against others, and the needs of religious or ethnic minorities, however important, cannot necessarily be allowed to override those constraints which have to apply to everyone, in planning as in other matters, in the interests of a tolerant and free society in a small and crowded country. 37.21 The appellants appear to have recognised that the attraction provided by the Manor has outgrown the capacity of Letchmore Heath to accommodate those it attracts, with the risk that the very basis of that attraction, a shrine in a peaceful village in the country, could be destroyed. The aims of the proposal for an alternative temple indicates the growth in popularity which is anticipated and the number of worshippers which might have to be catered for. No further consideration seems to have been given however to acquiring a country mansion in a more remote spot, or a redundant ecclesiastical or educational building closer to the centres of the Hindu population. I appreciate that a very high standard of Puja has been developed at the Manor, which is appreciated by a large congregation, but I am not convinced that the Manor is the only place where this can be carried on, and it appears that as recently as 8 years ago a Math could readily be set up at Croome Court and quickly given up when economic conditions so dictated. 37.22 It was suggested that need justified an exception to, or setting aside Green Belt policy altogether in this particular case. However, when I weigh on one side the needs of the appellants and their congregation and on the other not just for the Green Belt policy, but the actual disquiet and inconvenience to residents, and add to that the positive duty which Conservation Area status imposes on the decision maker, not just to preserve but also to enhance the character of Letchmore Heath, I consider that the interests of the village and its residents should prevail, and that there is insufficient justification for setting aside that weight of policy as well as other specific and convincing planning objections. 37.23 The decision on the merits should in my view also take into account the decision in respect of the Dagger Lane site. If planning permission is granted for a new temple, then my conclusions on the merits in respect of the enforcement notice have that much more force, because an alternative site has been provided, in accordance with the advice in Annex B of Circular 22/80. However if there is to be no new temple, it still seems to me that the combination of policy and clearly identifiable physical disadvantages to the use at Letchmore Heath constitute spcific and convincing planning objections of such force that they amply outweigh and displace the arguments on the grounds of need, even though those arguments then become that much stronger. 37.24 I turn finally to conditions. Every encouragement is given by Circulars 22/80 and PPG Note 1 to temper enforcement action by granting planning permission subject to suitable conditions. In this case the planning authority have shown themselves willing for at least 10 years to devise some machinery whereby the religious aspirations of the appellants and their devotees can be equated with the interests of the residents. Whilst it is not for me to disagree with the legal interpretation of the Section 52 Agreement, it does seem to me that the appellants have chosen to disregard the spirit if not the letter of it, and I can only conclude that they are unwilling on principle to restrict the number of people attending their premises in the interests of the neighbouring residents. 37.25 It seems to me that a condition limiting numbers would be the only basis on which the damage to amenity caused by the scale of the public worship and public entertainment activities could be remedied. Given the past history however I have the gravest doubts as to whether such a condition could be enforced, and the very fact that such a condition is necessary points to the fundamental unsuitability of the premises for activities of this kind on anything but a purely local scale. I have to agree with the planning authority that restrictions on numbers have already been proved not to work. I can think of no other form of condition which would remedy the damage to the amenities of the village caused by the present activities, and I do not consider therefore that a conditional permission is appropriate ..." On 20 March 1990 the Secretary of State, bearing in mind the Inspector's report, largely confirmed the enforcement notice (including his conclusions as to estoppel), with the variation that ISKCON had two years rather than six months to cease the prohibited use, and a minor amendment was made to the use to which the Manor and land could be put. ISKCON exercised their statutory right of appeal under Section 246(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 (now Section 289 of the Town and Planning Act 1990). Their Notice of Motion included as a ground of appeal that ISKCON were prepared to enter into a new Section 52 Agreement, but did not repeat the estoppel argument. Mr. Justice Kennedy, giving the judgment of the High Court on 31 October 1991, noted that it was no longer challenged by the applicants that there had been a material change of use of the Manor. Instead, the applicants argued, inter alia, (i) that the Inspector and the Secretary of State had failed to have proper regard to the willingness of the applicants to enter into a new Section 52 Agreement and (ii) that the Secretary of State had been wrong to accept the Inspector's conclusion that the planning objections outweighed the arguments of the applicants on the ground of need. As to the former submission, the Court held that, as was clear from the Inspector's report, negotiations for a further Section 52 Agreement had broken down. There had been an earlier agreement, but for present purposes it was not material. So, even accepting that the appellants were willing to enter into an agreement on their own terms, the position was, as Counsel for the Secretary of State graphically described it, like one hand clapping. There was nothing for the Inspector of the Secretary of State to take into account. On the latter point, ISKCON criticised the Secretary of State's acceptance of the Inspector's conclusion in paragraph 37.23 of his report that even if planning permission were not granted in respect of the Dagger Lane site, '...the combination of policy and clearly identifiable physical disadvantages to the use at Letchmore Heath constitute specific and convincing planning objections of such force that they amply outweigh and displace the arguments on the grounds of need, even though those arguments then become that much stronger.' It was argued by ISKCON that the Inspector's conclusion was founded at least in part on misapprehensions. For example, he was wrong to suggest, without any evidential basis, that if a new temple were to be built there would be increased activity at the Manor due to fund raising, or that the appellants might be unable to complete a new temple project within the time scale allowed. The Court rejected ISKCON's submissions on the grounds that the matters on which the Inspector really relied were matters of substance, which permeated his report. This approach was indicated in paragraph 37.22 of the Report (see above). The Secretary of State was entitled to regard the Inspector's conclusions as firmly founded, and there was no substance in any of the points which had been argued in support of the appeal. ISKCON applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal to the Court of Appeal. On 16 March 1992 Lord Justice Glidewell agreed largely with the decision of Mr Justice Kennedy of 31 October 1991. Leave to appeal was refused. With the refusal of leave to appeal, the two year period for compliance with the enforcement notice began to run. Relevant domestic law Section 174 (2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides for the following grounds for appeal to the Secretary of State against an enforcement notice: "(a) that planning permission ought to be granted for the development to which the notice relates or, as the case may be, that a condition or limitation alleged in the enforcement notice not to have been complied with ought to be discharged: (b) that the matters alleged in the notice do not constitute a breach of planning control; (c) that the breach of planning control alleged in the notice has not taken place; ... (g) that the steps required by the notice to be taken exceed what is necessary to remedy any breach of planning control or to achieve a purpose specified in Section 173 (4); (h) that the period specified in the notice as the period within which any step is to be taken falls short of what should reasonably be allowed." An appeal against the Secretary of State may be made to the High Court "on a point of law" (Section 289 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990). COMPLAINTS The complaints made by ISKCON. ISKCON allege a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. ISKCON accept that the enforcement notice appears to satisfy the requirements of lawfulness and legitimate purpose in Article 9 para. 2, but consider that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society". In particular, they consider that the enforcement notice, subsequent proceedings and the attitude shown by the authorities were unnecessarily harsh and failed to give sufficient weight to the importance of the Manor as a place of worship and inspiration for Hindus. In this respect they also point to a letter of 17 September 1992 from a minister at the Department of the Environment that "[r]eligious aspects of the Society's activities at Bhaktivedanta Manor were not relevant" to the enforcement and planning appeals, and to further letters to the same effect of 26 August and 22 December 1993 from an official and a minister at the Department of the Environment respectively. They consider that, in an increasingly ethnically diverse Europe, the Commission should not hesitate, in an appropriate case, to adopt a narrow margin of appreciation under Article 9. ISKCON regard the Section 52 Agreement of 25 January 1983 as evidence of what the council then accepted as reasonable, and that without giving good reasons for changing their mind, the council's subsequent enforcement notice and proceedings were disproportionate. ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. ISKCON consider that because of the link with religious freedom, a narrower approach should be made to Article 1 of the First Protocol than is normally the case, and they argue that Muslims, Catholics and Protestants have been given permission to use premises for public worship within Green Belt areas where they have not been so permitted. ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention in that they were entitled to access to a court with the full guarantees of Article 6 in respect neither of their property rights, nor in respect of their right to freedom of religion. They point out that the proceedings before the Planning Inspector were non- judicial, recommendatory in character and subject to alteration or confirmation at the Secretary of State's discretion, and that the scope of review of the appeal to the High Court (and subsequent application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal) was not sufficient to comply with Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 13 of the Convention to the extent that Article 6 para. 1 may be found not to be applicable. The complaints made by the 8 individual applicants The individual applicants have each submitted a statement to the Commission indicating how seriously he or she will be affected if the enforcement notice takes effect. They ask the Commission to construe Article 9 of the Convention according to international standards and developments, with particular reference to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief, 1981. Those applicants who are parents also rely on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in that they are not able to ensure education and teaching in conformity with their religious convictions, and that they are no longer able to ensure this because of the enforcement notice served on ISKCON. The individual applicants also allege violations of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION The application was introduced on 24 April 1992 and registered on 13 August 1992. On 10 February 1993 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government for written observations on its admissibility and merits. The Government's observations were submitted on 3 June 1993, and the applicant's observations in reply on 13 September 1993. On 16 February 1994 the applicants' representatives informed the Commission that the third named individual applicant had died, and that they wished to withdraw the application in respect of that applicant. THE LAW 1. The Commission notes first that the third named individual applicant has died in the course of the proceedings before the Commission, and that the applicants' representatives have expressed the wish to withdraw the application to the extent that it concerns him. The Commission finds that, to the extent that the application relates to the third named individual applicant, the conditions of Article 30 para. 1 (a) (Art. 30-1-a) of the Convention have been fulfilled, and that respect for Human Rights as defined in the Convention does not require continuation of the examination of the petition. 2. ISKCON allege a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention in that the enforcement proceedings in respect of Bhaktivedanta Manor interfered in an unjustified way with their freedom of religion. Article 9 (Art. 9) provides as follows: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." The Government submit that the interest and importance of ISKCON's rights under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention were fully taken into account by the Inspector's report and the Secretary of State's decision. The Commission notes at the outset that ISKCON do not allege that the mere existence of planning legislation violated their rights under the Convention. Indeed, the Convention organs have found on several occasions that contracting States enjoy a wide discretion in regulating planning matters (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lonnröth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 26 para. 69, and, in the context of the United Kingdom legislation, Chater v, the United Kingdom, No. 11723/85, Dec. 7.5.87, D.R. 52 p. 250, 256). It is against this background that the Commission must assess the compliance with Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of any interference with ISKCON's right under Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) of the Convention. ISKCON Ltd. is a registered charity in the United Kingdom. It is part of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, which is the world-wide promoter of Vayishnavism, the worship of Krishna. ISKCON's use of Bhaktivedanta Manor began in 1973 when the Manor was acquired, and developed as the Manor became more successful and better known. The Commission is prepared to assume that the issue of the enforcement notices to limit use of the manor to that which was permitted when ISKCON acquired the manor amounts to an interference with ISKCON's freedom of religion, including the freedom to manifest that religion in worship, teaching, practice and observance. The Commission finds that the limitation on ISKCON's freedom to manifest its religion was prescribed by law in that the domestic town and country planning legislation was applied. It has not been suggested that that legislation was insufficiently clear or otherwise in conflict with the requirement that it be "prescribed by law". It has, however, been submitted by ISKCON that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society" although they accept that the aim of the interference was to protect the rights of others, namely the residents of the nearby village. The Commission in addition finds an element of protection of public order or health in the aim of the interference, in that planning legislation is generally accepted as necessary in modern society to prevent uncontrolled development. The adjective "necessary" in the second paragraph of Articles 8 to 11 (Art. 8, 9, 10, 11) of the Convention implies the existence of a "pressing social need". Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts. The task of the Convention organs is not to substitute their view for that of the competent national authorities, but rather to review under the Article at issue the decisions delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercises its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Convention organs have to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are "relevant and sufficient" (cf., in the context of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, p. 29 para. 50, with further reference). Applying these principles to the present case, the Commission notes that ISKCON do not in substance contend that the planning law was wrongly applied. Rather, they consider that as the local authority had initially entered into a Section 52 Agreement with ISKCON, the requirement of proportionality would have been better met by imposing additional conditions on the use of the Manor than by serving an enforcement notice prohibiting the established use of the Manor. They also point out that the effect of the enforcement notice was to deprive them of their rights under the Section 52 Agreement to admit up to 1,000 people per day to the Manor. They also lay emphasis on the fact that inadequate weight was given to their freedom of religion in the proceedings. As to the Section 52 Agreement, the Commission notes that the agreement in the present case was part of continuing attempts by the local authority and ISKCON to resolve their planning differences, in this case by entering into a contract relating to the use of the land. Moreover, as pointed out by the Inspector, it was not only implicit in the Agreement that further enforcement notices might be served if it were deemed expedient, but negotiations for a further Section 52 Agreement had broken down. Even assuming that conditions acceptable to the local authority had been proposed for inclusion in the existing, or in a new, Section 52 Agreement, the Commission does not consider that the decision of the local authority to control the use of the property by recourse to the statutory enforcement powers, rather than by means of contractual provisions, was in the circumstances disproportionate to the legitimate aim. Similarly the decision was not in the Commission's view rendered disproportionate by the fact that on planning grounds, the local authority were no longer prepared to contemplate visits to the Manor by up to 1,000 persons per day. With regard to the weight given to ISKCON's right to religion in the enforcement proceedings, the Commission notes that although the courts were limited in their review of the Secretary of State's decision to confirm the enforcement notices, the Inspector who held an inquiry into the enforcement notices gave detailed consideration to the special circumstances of the case. Although he came to the conclusion that the special circumstances were not sufficient to outweigh the general planning considerations, the Commission finds that sufficient weight was given to the position of ISKCON and the difficulties faced if the user of Bhaktivedanta Manor was limited to that which was permitted in 1973. In particular, the Commission does not consider that Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention can be used to circumvent existing planning legislation, provided that in the proceedings under that legislation, adequate weight is given to freedom of religion. In contending that inadequate weight was given to ISKCON's freedom of religion, the applicants rely on statements in letters sent by Ministers and an official of the Department of the Environment to the effect that the decision on ISKCON's appeal against the enforcement notice was based on the relevant land-use planning grounds and that "the religious aspects of the Society's activities at Bhaktivedanta Manor were not relevant". The Commission does not interpret these statements as suggesting that the religious importance of the Manor to the members of ISKCON was not fully taken into account and weighed against the general planning considerations, but rather as making clear that the refusal of planning permisison was based on proper planning grounds and not on any objections to the religious aspects of the activities of ISKCON. It is in any event clear from the terms of the Inspector's Report and the decision letter of the Secretary of State that considerable weight was attached to the religious needs and interests of the members of ISKCON and to the importance of the Manor in relation to the religious activities of the members. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the interference with ISKCON's right to freedom of religion under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention can be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society". It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 3. ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 (P1-1+14) of the Convention. Given that the aim of the enforcement notice served on ISKCON was to limit the use of the property to that which was permitted when ISKCON acquired it, the Commission finds that there is some doubt as to whether there has been any interference with ISKCON's right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. In particular, the Commission considers that, as a general principle, the protection of property rights ensured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) cannot be used as a ground for claiming planning permission to extend permitted use of property. However, assuming that there is such an interference, any limitation on use requires justification in the public interest if it amounts to deprivation of possessions, or in the general interest if it constitutes the control of property. Although the effect of the enforcement notices is radically to alter the use to which Bhaktivedanta Manor has been put in recent years, the Commission finds that it does not amount to a deprivation of possessions, but a control of the use of property. Accordingly, the Commission must supervise the lawfulness, purpose and proportionality of the restrictions. The Commission must determine whether, whilst recognising the wide margin of appreciation afforded to States in planning matters, a fair balance was struck between the general interest of the community and the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (cf. No. 11723/85, Dec. 7.5.87, D.R. 52 p. 250, 256 with further references). The Commission finds that planning controls are necessary and desirable in modern society in order to preserve and improve town and country landscapes (cf. the above-mentioned Chater decision, D.R. 52 p. 256). As to proportionality, the Commission notes that the Inspector who held the inquiry into the enforcement notices found that the Manor had caused a certain amount of disturbance to neighbouring residents, and that at times it gave rise to considerable traffic problems. If the Inspector and/or the Secretary of State had taken into account irrelevant matters, or if they had failed to take into account matters which were relevant, these matters could have been raised on the appeal against the Secretary of State's decision. The Commission finds no indication in the Inspector's report, and the subsequent decision by the Minister, that the various interests involved were not duly taken into consideration. In the light of these considerations, the Commission finds that a proper balance has been struck between ISKCON's interests and the general interest. In connection with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, the Commission notes that ISKCON withdrew allegations of racial or religious prejudice in the the planning inquiry, as there was no evidence of bad faith of the part of the local authority in relation to the adoption on the enforcement notice. In such circumstances, alleged prejudice and hostility from individuals cannot be of relevance to the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The Commission finds that the control of the use of ISKCON's property, which prevents ISKCON from using Bhaktivedanta Manor for purposes, broadly, beyond what was permitted in 1973, is, therefore, in accordance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), and does not raise any issues under Article 14 (P1-1+14) of the Convention in connection with that provision. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 4. ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention on the ground that they were entitled to, but did not have, the benefit of a court decision to determine the interference with their freedom of religion. They link this with a complaint that the global review of the High Court was limited to questions of law. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides as follows: "1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law..." The Government do not accept that ISKCON had a "civil right" to freedom of religion, although they point out that there are no restrictions, civil or criminal, which limit a person's freedom to practice his religion as such. They consider that the alleged civil right in issue was whether or not ISKCON's religious interests and need outweighed the evident planning concerns in the case. In this respect, they submit that the proceedings before the Inspector complied with the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, but that in any event the appeal to the High Court, and the possibility of judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision, satisfied the requirement of "full jurisdiction" inherent in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. To the extent that ISKCON complain of a denial of access to court in respect of the enforcement orders on their freedom of religion, or in respect of their freedom of religion as such, the Commission recalls that it is not the function of Article 6 (Art. 6) to regulate the content of civil "rights and obligations" (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,W. judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 32 para. 73). The Commission notes, as ISKCON submit, that freedom of religion has no formal status as a right which is guaranteed in United Kingdom domestic law. Accordingly, disputes over freedom of religion of the type involved in the present case do not determine "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. There remains, however, the complaint that the High Court could only consider points of law in connection with the determination of the civil rights which were at issue, that is, the "pure" planning issues. The Government contend that the proceedings before the Inspector complied with Article 6 (Art. 6), in which case the Commission is not required to consider the proceedings at the High Court with such close scrutiny. However, the Commission is not required to make a finding as to this question, as this part of the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons. The Commission recalls that appeals against the decisions of administrative bodies, which themselves do not comply with Article 6 (Art. 6), will only be consistent with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention if they are conducted before "judicial bodies that have full jurisdiction" (Eur. Court H.R., Albert and Le Compte judgment of 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, p. 16, para. 29). It is true that Section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides that appeals to the High Court against enforcement notices may only be made "on a point of law". The local authority did not, however, have a complete discretion in taking enforcement proceedings. In particular, it could only take proceedings in circumstances within the limits defined by Section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (which sets out the grounds of appeal to the Secretary of State), and in accordance with its own structure plans and the policy guidance laid down in various documents by the Secretary of State. ISKCON were then able to have a determination from the High Court of whether the legal aspects (that is, "points of law",) of these requirements had been met. The Commission recalls that the High Court dealt with each of ISKCON's grounds of appeal on its merits, point by point, without ever having to decline jurisdiction. Moreover, it was open to ISKCON to contend in the High Court that findings of fact by the Inspector and/or the Secretary of State were unsupported by evidence, as they could have argued that the administrative authorities failed to take into account an actual fact or did take into account an immaterial fact. Finally, the High Court could have interfered with the administrative authorities' decisions if those decisions had been irrational having regard to the facts established by the authorities. It is not the role of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention to give access to a level of jurisdiction which can substitute its opinion for that of the administrative authorities on questions of expediency and where the courts do not refuse to examine any of the points raised: Article 6 (Art. 6) gives a right to a court that has "full jurisdiction" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Zumtobel judgment of 21 September 1993, Series A no.268-A, para. 32). In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the review by the High Court fulfilled the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. 5. ISKCON finally allege a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in that no domestic remedy was available to them to make their complaints under, principally, Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention. However, the guarantees of Article 13 (Art. 13) apply only to a grievance which can be regarded as "arguable" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Powell and Rayner judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 14 para. 31, with further references). In the present case, the Commission has rejected the substantive claims as disclosing no appearance of a violation of the Convention. For similar reasons, it cannot be regarded as "arguable". It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 6. The eight individual applicants each allege violations of Articles 9, 6 and 13 (Art. 9, 6, 13) of the Convention on the same grounds as ISKCON, save that they do not make the allegations relating to property rights. Those applicants who are parents also contend that they are not able to ensure that their children are taught in accordance with their convictions as Bhaktivedanta Manor will no longer be fully operational. They see a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention in this respect. The Commission has had regard to the statements submitted by the individual applicants and accepts that each of them is sufficiently affected by the decisions of the domestic authorities to be able to claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention. However, the reasons for the Commission's findings in the paragraphs above in relation to ISKCON apply, mutatis mutandis, to the individual applicants. In the same way as ISKCON cannot derive from the Convention a right to exemption from the ordinary planning controls (provided due attention is paid to their interests), the individual applicants must accept that the enforcement of those planning controls affects the modalities of their worship and, so far as relevant, the education of their children. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission unanimously DECIDES TO STRIKE THE APPLICATION OUT OF ITS LIST OF CASES to the extent that it relates to the third named individual applicant, and by a majority DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber (M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)