AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application No. 33283/96 by Anders and Gun PARADIS against Sweden The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 2 July 1997, the following members being present: Mrs. G.H. THUNE, President MM. J.-C. GEUS G. JÖRUNDSSON A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK J.-C. SOYER H. DANELIUS F. MARTINEZ M.A. NOWICKI I. CABRAL BARRETO J. MUCHA D. SVÁBY P. LORENZEN E. BIELIUNAS E.A. ALKEMA A. ARABADJIEV Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the application introduced on 20 July 1996 by Anders and Gun Paradis against Sweden and registered on 1 October 1996 under file No. 33283/96; Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having deliberated; Decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicants, a married couple, are Swedish citizens and were born in 1946 and 1950, respectively. The first applicant is a clergyman and the second applicant is an instructor of data processing. They reside in Angered. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. Taking into public care In the beginning of 1995 the Social District Council (stadsdelsnämnden) of Lärjedalen, Göteborg, applied to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Göteborg and Bohus for a care order concerning the applicants' sons Mattias, born in 1977, Johan, born in 1979, Mikael, born in 1982, and Stefan, born in 1984. The application was made pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (Lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga, 1990:52; hereinafter "the 1990 Act"), according to which compulsory care is to be provided if there is a clear risk of impairment of the health and development of a person under 18 years of age due to ill-treatment, exploitation, lack of care or any other condition in the home and if the necessary care cannot be provided with the consent of the young person's custodian. The Council claimed that the sons' health had already been impaired due to physical and mental ill-treatment and that there was a clear risk of further impairment. After having held an oral hearing in the case, the County Administrative Court, on 24 February 1995, granted the Social District Council's application and ordered that the children be taken into public care. The court noted that the Council's investigation contained information from several different sources on physical and mental ill-treatment of the children. Particular regard was had to a report from the Children's Psychiatric Clinic (Barn- och ungdomspsykiatriska mottagningen) in Angered, which included such information given by the family members themselves. The court also took into account the statement of the chief physician at the clinic, according to whom all the children were in need of psychiatric help on account of the conditions in their home. The applicants, Mattias and Johan appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Göteborg. The appellate court held a further hearing in the case. By judgment of 13 June 1995, it upheld the care order in so far as it concerned Johan and Stefan but discontinued the public care of Mattias and Mikael. The court found the investigation in the case to show that the conditions in the applicants' home had at times been chaotic and that the children had been punished, sometimes physically, by their father. Mattias, Johan and Stefan had on different occasions run away from home and school. According to the court, Johan and Stefan had problems which required therapeutic treatment. In addition, Stefan had been diagnosed as having a brain damage from birth and showed autistic signs. Their special care needs could not be met by the applicants. Noting that the children had different personalities and that Mattias and Mikael had been less affected by the conditions in the family, the court found that there were not sufficient grounds for taking Mattias and Mikael into compulsory care. On 6 July 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) refused leave to appeal against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal. Placement of Johan By decision of 10 May 1995, the Social District Council placed Johan at the Tallbacken Children's Home (behandlingshem) in Vaxholm, which later changed its name to the Roslagen Pupils' Home (elevhem). The applicants did not appeal against the initial placement decision. On 17 October 1995 the Council decided that the placement of Johan should continue. The applicants appealed and requested that he be placed in a Christian home. By decision of 22 December 1995, the County Administrative Court found that no appeal lay from the decision of 17 October 1995. The court referred to Section 41 of the 1990 Act, according to which only decisions concerning an initial placement or a change of placement could be appealed against. Moreover, according to the travaux préparatoires to the Section in question, also a decision refusing a request for a removal of the child from the home where he or she was staying could be appealed against. As none of these situations was at hand, the appeal was dismissed. On 11 March 1996 this decision was upheld on appeal by the Administrative Court of Appeal. On 8 May 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal. On 19 January 1996 the applicants requested the Social District Council to remove Johan from the Roslagen Pupils' Home. On 5 March 1996 Johan ran away from the home. After having been in hiding for two months, he is now living with a Christian family in Göteborg. Apparently, the Council has not taken any decision in regard to the applicant's removal request. Restrictions on access By decision of 19 March 1996, the Social District Council refused the applicants access to Johan, by personal visits and by telephone calls, for a period of three months. The applicants appealed against the decision. By judgment of 25 April 1996, the County Administrative Court rejected the appeal. It found the investigation in the case to show that the applicants had a negative impact on Johan and that his contacts with them hampered his development and his ability to profit from the treatment he was undergoing at the Roslagen Pupils' Home. Noting that Johan had run away from the home on 5 March 1996 and that his whereabouts were still unknown, the court considered that his escape had been supported by the applicants. The court thus concluded that there were sufficient grounds for the Council's decision. Upon the applicants' further appeal, the Administrative Court of Appeal, on 23 May 1996, set aside the County Administrative Court's judgment, noting that the Council on 16 April 1996, i.e. before that judgment, had revoked the access restrictions. Placement and continued care of Stefan, legal aid On 5 May 1995 Stefan was placed with foster parents in Vårgårda in a so-called home for care and housing (hem för vård och boende; hereinafter "HVB"). The applicants appealed against the placement, requesting that he be placed in a Christian home where the parents were regular churchgoers. The County Administrative Court held an oral hearing, at which it heard the applicants, Stefan's counsel and representatives of the Social District Council. By judgment of 21 August 1995, it rejected the applicants' appeal. The court noted that Stefan, in accordance with the applicants' wishes, had been placed in a special school due to his brain damage. The school's requirement that he be placed in an HVB had led to the placement with the foster parents in question, one of the few homes which accepted children with Stefan's special problems. The court noted that no complaints had previously been made against the foster parents and found that Stefan had had a positive development with them. Moreover, he was allowed to practise his faith and the foster parents were willing to take him to church. The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal which held a further hearing and heard, in addition to the persons who had appeared before the County Administrative Court, three witnesses and a representative of the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen). On 13 December 1995 it rejected the appeal on basically the same grounds as the County Administrative Court. On 22 January 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicants leave to appeal. On 16 August 1996 the applicants requested that the public care of Stefan be terminated and that he be allowed to move back to the applicants. On 15 September 1996 Stefan ran away from his foster parents and the Social District Council has, as a consequence, not taken any decision in regard to the applicant's request. He is presently in hiding and has refused to take part in an investigation at the Children's Psychiatric Clinic, as requested by the Council. The applicants applied for legal aid in the case concerning termination of care and requested that a designated lawyer, Mrs. Siv Westerberg, be appointed. On 9 September 1996 the County Administrative Court noted that the applicants were entitled to a legal aid lawyer but found that the lawyer in question did not have the necessary qualifications. The request for appointment of that lawyer was accordingly rejected and the applicants were given an opportunity to name another lawyer. On 19 September 1996 this decision was upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal and on 5 November 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal. Later the applicants requested that the County Administrative Court instead appoint Mrs. Ruby Harrold-Claesson as their legal aid lawyer. This request was refused on 14 November 1996 on the same grounds as the decision not to appoint Mrs. Westerberg. The applicants' appeal was rejected by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 20 December 1996. The applicants have since made an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court where, apparently, the case is presently pending. COMPLAINTS 1. The applicants complain of the taking into care of their children. They maintain that the Social District Council investigation which served as a basis for the taking into care was biased and contained misinterpretations and distorted facts. Furthermore, the measure in question was made in disregard of the applicants' and their children's Christian faith and traditions. 2. The applicants also complain about the placements of Johan and Stefan in their respective homes where, allegedly, they have received inferior treatment or none at all. Furthermore, they have been placed in non-Christian settings which shows a contempt for their Christian faith. The placements constitute a denial of the parents' right to educate their children in a religious manner and limit the children's freedom of religion. Allegedly, Johan and Stefan are not allowed to attend church services. 3. Moreover, the applicants challenge the decision of the Social District Council of 19 March 1996 to restrict their access to Johan. 4. The applicants further claim that the court proceedings in the case have not been impartial, as the courts have had to rely on biased statements of psychologists employed by the social authorities. 5. The applicants also complain about the courts' refusal to appoint either of the lawyers designated by them in the case concerning termination of the care of Stefan. 6. The applicants also claim, inter alia, that Johan and Stefan have been physically assaulted at their respective homes, that Johan has had his personal belongings stolen or destroyed, that the treatment of Stefan has led to his expressing suicidal thoughts and that the children have been denied their freedom of speech by the restrictions on telephone calls and by the fact that their sentiments have been neglected by the social authorities and the courts. Moreover, by denying the children the right to take part in, inter alia, church services and recreational activities, their right to freedom of association has been violated. The applicants invoke Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17 and 25 of the Convention, Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. THE LAW 1. The applicants complain of the taking into care of their children. They maintain that the Social District Council investigation which served as a basis for the taking into care was biased and contained misinterpretations and distorted facts. Furthermore, the measure in question was made in disregard of the applicants' and their children's Christian faith and traditions. The Commission, however, is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a violation of the Articles invoked as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken". The Commission recalls that the taking into care of Johan and Stefan became final by the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 6 July 1995 not to grant the applicants leave to appeal. The present application was introduced on 20 July 1996, which is more than six months after this decision. It follows that this part of the application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention. 2. The applicants complain about the placements of Johan and Stefan in their respective homes where, allegedly, they have received inferior treatment or none at all. Furthermore, they have been placed in non-Christian settings which shows a contempt for their Christian faith. The placements constitute a denial of the parents' right to educate their children in a religious manner and limit the children's freedom of religion. Allegedly, Johan and Stefan are not allowed to attend church services. The Commission notes first that the applicants did not appeal against the Social District Council's decision of 10 May 1995 on the initial placement of Johan. Thus, in respect of this decision, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a violation of the Articles invoked as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it "may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted". It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention. It is true that the applicants later requested that Johan be removed from the home where he was placed. However, soon thereafter Johan escaped from the home and he is now living with a Christian family, apparently of his own choice. As a consequence, no decision has been taken by the Social District Council or the courts on the question of removal of Johan. Noting that, after Johan's escape, there was no longer any practical interest in deciding on the question of removal, the Commission considers that an examination of this complaint fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms of the Convention and in particular the Articles invoked. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. As regards the question of the placement of Stefan, the Commission considers that the complaint should first be examined under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which reads as follows: "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Considering that the placement of Stefan with foster parents interfered with the applicant's right to respect for his family life as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, the Commission finds that it must be examined whether this interference was justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2). In this respect, the Commission recalls that three conditions must be satisfied: the interference must be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2 and it must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that aim or those aims. It has not been contested that the placement was made in conformity with Swedish law. Moreover, the Commission finds that the measure had a legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests of the child, which in this case fall under the expressions "for the protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the child. According to the established case-law of the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States. However, the Commission's review is not limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith. Furthermore, it cannot confine itself to considering the relevant decisions in isolation but must look at them in the light of the case as a whole. It must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and sufficient" (cf. Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68). In the present case, the Commission recalls that the County Administrative Court, in its judgment of 21 August 1995 which was upheld on appeal, noted that Stefan, in accordance with the applicants' wishes, had been placed in a special school due to his brain damage. The school's requirement that he be placed in an HVB had led to the placement with the foster parents in question, one of the few homes which accepted children with Stefan's special problems. The court further noted that no complaints had previously been made against the foster parents and found that Stefan had had a positive development with them. Moreover, he was allowed to practise his faith and the foster parents were willing to take him to church. The Commission further recalls that both the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal held oral hearings at which they heard the parties and certain witnesses. Thus, the courts cannot be said to have intervened without adequate knowledge of the case. In the light of the foregoing the Commission finds that the decisions on the placement of Stefan were supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and that, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think that it was necessary to place Stefan with the foster parents in question. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the relevant decisions can reasonably be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. The applicants also invoke, inter alia, Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, which provides the following: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." The Commission notes that, by the placement of Stefan with the foster parents in question, no express restrictions were put on his freedom to manifest his religion. It is true that the applicants claim that he was placed in a non-Christian setting. The Commission recalls, however, that when placing Stefan several factors had to be taken into consideration, including his special needs owing to a brain damage. The Commission cannot find that, in the circumstances of the case, the placement with the foster parents in question showed any lack of respect for his freedom of religion. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 3. The applicants challenge the decision of the Social District Council of 19 March 1996 to restrict their access to Johan. The Commission, noting that the decision did not have any practical effect as Johan, at the time, had already escaped from the Roslagen Pupils' Home and that it was later revoked by the Council's decision of 16 April 1996, considers that an examination of this complaint fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms of the Convention and in particular the Articles invoked. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 4. The applicants claim that the court proceedings in the case have not been impartial, as the courts have had to rely on biased statements of psychologists employed by the social authorities. The Commission, noting that the courts have held several oral hearings in the case at which, inter alia, the applicants have been present and heard, considers that the applicants' submissions fail to substantiate the present complaint. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 5. The applicants complain about the courts' refusal to appoint either of the lawyers designated by them in the case concerning termination of the care of Stefan. The Commission considers that this complaint should be examined under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows: "1. In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal... 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ... c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; ..." The Commission recalls that, although the Convention contains no provision on legal assistance in civil rights disputes, Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) dealing only with criminal proceedings, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to court (cf. Eur. Court HR, Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 14-16, para. 26). However, Article 6 (Art. 6) does not guarantee a right to choose which lawyer should be appointed by the court (cf., e.g., No. 12152/86, Dec. 9.5.89, D.R. 61, p. 171). In the present case, the County Administrative Court found that the applicants were entitled to a legal aid lawyer. The courts, however, refused to appoint either of the two lawyers designated by the applicants as they were found not to have the necessary qualifications. The Commission cannot find that these decisions were arbitrary. It further notes that the applicants have the opportunity to name another lawyer who could be accepted by the courts. Thus, the Commission finds that the relevant decisions do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicants' rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 6. The applicants also claim, inter alia, that Johan and Stefan have at times not been allowed to go to school, that they have been physically assaulted at their respective homes, that Johan has had his personal belongings stolen or destroyed, that the treatment of Stefan has led to his expressing suicidal thoughts and that the children have been denied their freedom of speech by the restrictions on telephone calls and by the fact that their sentiments have been neglected by the social authorities and the courts. Moreover, by denying the children the right to take part in, inter alia, church services and recreational activities, their right to freedom of association has been violated. The Commission, having examined the separate complaints as they have been submitted, considers, however, that they fail to disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicants' rights under the Convention and its Protocols and in particular the Articles invoked.It follows that these parts of the application are also manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously, DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. M.-T. SCHOEPFER G.H. THUNE Secretary President to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber