AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application No. 20402/92 by Bror SPETZ and others against Sweden The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 12 October 1994, the following members being present: MM. S. TRECHSEL, President H. DANELIUS G. JÖRUNDSSON J.-C. SOYER H.G. SCHERMERS Mrs. G.H. THUNE MM. F. MARTINEZ L. LOUCAIDES J.-C. GEUS M.A. NOWICKI I. CABRAL BARRETO J. MUCHA D. SVÁBY Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the application introduced on 11 July 1992 by Bror SPETZ and Others against Sweden and registered on 31 July 1992 under file No. 20402/92; Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having deliberated; Decides as follows: THE FACTS a. The particular circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. The applicants are 1) a Swedish nonconformist congregation in Stockholm, Södermalms Fria Församling (the Congregation), 2) four pastors of the Congregation, Bror Spetz, Bertil Swärd, Carl-Gustaf Severin and Klas Lindberg, born in 1926, 1943, 1953 and 1954 respectively, and 3) a couple, Andreas and Monika Mannerström, and their daughter, Miriam, born in 1968 and 1966 and on 5 May 1992 respectively. All individual applicants are Swedish citizens. Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mrs. Siv Westerberg, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg, Sweden. The Congregation was founded some 60 years ago. It considers itself to be, and to have always been, an independent congregation within the Pentecostal Movement (Pingströrelsen). It has four pastors, the above-mentioned applicants, and about 1900 members. By Government decision of 12 September 1952, the Pentecostal Movement was granted a right to celebrate marriages (vigselrätt). Since the Pentecostal Movement consists of several independent congregations which do not have a common administration, a special Marriage Board (vigselnämnd) was set up within the Movement to authorise celebrants (vigselförrättare). According to the decision, only officials of Pentecostal congregations with specified qualifications were to be authorised. The decision further recalled that, according to a 1951 Royal Decree, authorised officials must, before conducting any marriage ceremonies, obtain a certificate showing their competence from the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen). After having been authorised by the Marriage Board, the applicant pastors received their certificates on 7 July 1955 (Spetz), 14 December 1976 (Swärd), 25 June 1979 (Severin) and 16 June 1987 (Lindberg). By decision of 8 December 1988, the Marriage Board revoked as from 1 July 1989 the right of the Congregation to celebrate marriages and thereby also the applicant pastors' authorisations to conduct marriage ceremonies. The pastors were requested to return their certificates of competence to the Marriage Board. According to the Board's opinion, the Congregation and its pastors had shown, in word and deed, by actively supporting breakaway factions, that they did not consider themselves to be part of the Pentecostal Movement. In a reply to the Marriage Board, the Congregation stated that it did not consider the Board competent to revoke the Congregation's right to celebrate marriages or the pastors' authorisations, and that the pastors did not intend to return their certificates. The Marriage Board then requested the County Administrative Board to revoke the certificates. By decision of 19 April 1989, the County Administrative Board refused the request. It stated that neither the 1951 Royal Decree nor the 1952 Government decision mentioned any grounds on which a celebrant's authorisation to conduct marriage ceremonies could be revoked, that the revocation of such an authorisation was to be regarded as an exercise of public authority, which should have a basis in law, and that the revocation of certificates had not been requested because the pastors no longer had the qualifications necessary according to said Government decision, but because the Congregation and its pastors could not be considered as members of the Pentecostal Movement. The County Administrative Board concluded that there was no basis in law to revoke the certificates as requested. The Marriage Board appealed to the Government. By way of a note on his certificate, the Marriage Board had indicated that Bertil Swärd's authorisation was revoked as of 1 July 1989. As he was due to conduct a marriage ceremony, he asked the County Administrative Board to explain whether he was still competent to do so. On 8 June 1989, the County Administrative Board replied that he had the right to conduct ceremonies until the revocation matter had been finally settled by the Government. Before the matter had thus been settled the four pastors of the Congregation had conducted 21 ceremonies, one of them on 9 September 1989 between the applicants Andreas and Monika Mannerström. By decision of 31 January 1991, the Government found that the pastors' right to conduct marriage ceremonies had been revoked by the decision of the Marriage Board and that this decision was final. The Government stated that by the decision of 1952 a power to exercise public authority had been conferred on the Marriage Board. The Government further noted that the Marriage Board's competence to authorise celebrants was limited to officials of the Pentecostal Movement, that, as a consequence, the Board had to make sure that a prospective celebrant was a member of a Pentecostal congregation, and that, as a further consequence, an official of a congregation that no longer belonged to the Movement could not invoke an authorisation by the Marriage Board. Recalling that, in accordance with Section 2 of the 1951 Royal Decree, the Marriage Board had to notify the County Administrative Board about the expiration of an authorisation, the Government further noted that the Marriage Board had to examine, whenever there were reasons for it, whether the conditions for an authorisation were still met, and, if that was not the case, take the appropriate decision. In two letters to the Congregation the Ministry of Justice explained that, as a consequence of the Government's decision, marriages conducted by the four pastors since 1 July 1989 were invalid. The Ministry, however, noted that, according to Chapter 4, Section 2, subsection 3 of the Code on Marriages (Äktenskapsbalken), the Government may, under special circumstances, declare valid otherwise invalid marriages. The Minister of Justice expressed her deep concern that the negative effects for the couples in question be eliminated and promised that applications for such declarations would be examined favourably. Only the man or the woman concerned or, in case one of them has died, the heirs of the deceased may apply for a declaration. An application by the Congregation for a declaration that the 21 marriage ceremonies conducted were valid was, accordingly, rejected by the Government on 8 May 1991. Only four of the 21 couples in question have applied to the Government for a declaration. Andreas and Monika Mannerström have not applied. The four applications have been granted, and the marriages have been declared valid as from the date of the ceremonies. The Congregation and the pastor Bror Spetz applied to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) for a review of the Government's decision under the Act on Judicial Review of Certain Administrative Decisions (Lagen om rättsprövning av vissa förvaltningsbeslut, 1988:205 - "the 1988 Act"). They alleged that the Marriage Board had been given only a limited right to exercise public authority which did not include the competence to revoke authorisations to conduct marriage ceremonies, and that, in any case, there must lie an appeal from the Marriage Board's decision as it is equivalent to a decision to expel members from a congregation, a decision from which an appeal lies according to the Freedom of Religion Act (Religionsfrihetslag, 1951:680). Since, as a consequence of the Government's decision, the marriages conducted since 1 July 1989 were invalid, they further submitted that the Government were not empowered to declare a marriage invalid and that the decision, especially with regard to its retroactive character, violated the provisions of the Code on Marriages concerning the requirements of a valid marriage. Finally, they claimed that the Government had not examined the merits of the appeal against the County Administrative Board's decision. On 18 February 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court refused to examine the application. The Court stated that, as the application did not concern any matter referred to in Chapter 8, Sections 2 or 3 of the Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen), the Court was not competent to examine it under the 1988 Act. The Congregation later requested the Government to declare their decision of 31 January 1991 not to have a retroactive effect, thereby making the 21 marriage ceremonies valid. The Congregation further requested to be granted a right to celebrate marriages. By decision of 15 April 1992, the Government stated that the previous decision did not contain an examination of the merits of the case, but only a confirmation that the Marriage Board's decision was final, and that, accordingly, the Government were not empowered to examine the Congregation's first request. The Government further noted, as a piece of information, that the certificates of competence issued by the County Administrative Board were of no independent importance as to the pastors' right to conduct marriage ceremonies, a matter which was not to be examined by the County Administrative Board, but by the Marriage Board. Finally, by decision of 23 April 1992, the Government rejected the Congregation's request to be granted a right to celebrate marriages. b. Relevant domestic law The provisions on how marriages are contracted are included in Chapter 4 of the Code on Marriages. Section 3 reads in relevant parts as follows: (translation) "Competent to conduct marriage ceremonies is 1. a clergyman of the Church of Sweden, 2. a priest or other official of another church, if the Goverment have granted the church a right to celebrate marriages and the County Administrative Board has issued a certificate of competence for that priest or official, ..." Further provisions concerning marriage ceremonies are to be found in the 1951 Royal Decree with Certain Provisions on Celebrants of Other Churches than the Church of Sweden (Kunglig kungörelse med vissa bestämmelser ang. vigselförrättare inom annat trossamfund än svenska kyrkan, 1951:703). Sections 1 and 2 of the Decree read, in so far as relevant, as follows: (translation) Section 1: "If the Government have authorised that marriages may be celebrated within a certain church by its priests or otherwise by officials of that church, such priest or official may not exercise his competence to conduct marriage ceremonies before the County Administrative Board of the county in which the church is located, on application by the church, has issued a certificate on his competence to conduct marriage ceremonies within the church." Section 2: "If a celebrant, referred to in Section 1, dies, or if his competence to conduct marriage ceremonies otherwise expires, the church is obliged to notify the County Administrative Board thereof without delay." The 1951 Decree was replaced by new legislation in 1987, but its Section 2 is still applicable to rights to celebrate marriages granted before 1988. COMPLAINTS 1. The applicants Andreas and Monika Mannerström claim that their right to marry and to found a family and their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions have been violated. Together with their daughter Miriam they also claim that their right to respect for their family life has been violated. They assert that, as a consequence of the Government's decision of 31 January 1991, the parents are not considered to be married and their daughter is thus considered to be born out of wedlock. Consequently, the parents do not have any right to each other's property, they do not inherit from one another and they cannot conclude a marital settlement. Furthermore, the father does not have legal custody of his daughter. The applicants therefore claim that they have been denied the legal security of a marriage and invoke Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 2. All applicants claim that they have been denied their rights to freedom of conscience and religion and to freedom of expression in violation of Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. They submit that the Marriage Board's decision of 8 December 1988 to revoke the right of the Congregation to celebrate marriages and, as a consequence, the applicant pastors' authorisations to conduct marriage ceremonies is a means of punishment directed at the applicants' Christian faith and the work that has been carried out within the Congregation. The pastors have thus, because of their position on certain questions of faith, been prohibited from exercising part of their profession. 3. All applicants further complain that their right to a hearing by a tribunal has been denied in violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. They maintain that the Government have conferred on the Marriage Board a power to exercise public authority without providing for legal remedies against the Board's decisions. Andreas, Monika and Miriam Mannerström claim that they have a right to a court hearing as regards the alleged violation of their right to family life. The applicant pastors claim that their right to practise their profession, which they consider to be a civil right, has been violated and that, in the determination of this right, they are entitled to a court hearing. THE LAW 1. The applicants Andreas, Monika and Miriam Mannerström claim that their rights to respect for their family life, to marry, to found a family and to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Articles 8 and 12 (Art. 8, 12) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) have been violated, since, as a consequence of the Government's decision of 31 January 1991, the marriage between Andreas and Monika Mannerström is not considered to be valid. The invoked provisions read in relevant parts as follows: Article 8 (Art. 8): "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. ..." Article 12 (Art. 12): "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right." Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1): "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. ..." The Commission notes that Andreas, Monika and Miriam Mannerström have not been parties to any proceedings and that the Government's decision of 31 January 1991, which has brought about the alleged violations of their Convention rights, has been taken more than six months before the introduction of the present application. The question therefore arises whether these applicants have complied with the conditions under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the observance of the six months period. The Commission also notes that Miriam Mannerström was not born at the time of the different decisions of the present case. Thus, the further question arises whether she can claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention. However, the Commission does not have to resolve these issues, as this part of the application is in any event manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons. The Commission recalls that the alleged violations now in question all derive from the fact that, following the Government's decision of 31 January 1991, the marriage between Andreas and Monika Mannerström, like other marriages conducted within the Congregation since 1 July 1989, is not considered to be valid. The Commission notes that the Government, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code on Marriages, have invited the couples concerned to apply for declarations that their marriages are valid and expressed that such applications will be examined favourably. The four applications lodged have all been granted, and those four marriages have been declared valid as from the date of the marriage ceremonies. The Commission, recalling that the right to marry under Article 12 (Art. 12) of the Convention is subject to the national laws governing the exercise of this right, finds that Andreas and Monika Mannerström, by applying to the Government, could have had their marriage declared valid. The Commission, therefore, considers that the present circumstances do not disclose any appearance of a violation of their right to marry. The alleged violations of their and Miriam Mannerström's rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) are all consequences of the invalid marriage. Consequently, the Commission further considers that the case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of these provisions either. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 2. All applicants claim that their rights to freedom of conscience and religion and to freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, 10) of the Convention have been violated by the Marriage Board's decision of 8 December 1988. Article 9 (Art. 9) reads as follows: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Article 10 (Art. 10) reads as follows: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." The Commission recalls that the Congregation and Bror Spetz have applied to the Supreme Administrative Court for a review of the Government's decision of 31 January 1991. The Court has, however, found that it lacks competence to deal with the application under the 1988 Act. The question, therefore, arises whether the application to the Supreme Administrative Court has constituted an effective remedy and, as the present application has been introduced on 11 July 1992, whether the Congregation and the applicant pastors have complied with the six months period laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. The Commission need, however, not resolve these issues, as this complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded for the reasons given below. The Commission recalls its constant case-law according to which Article 9 (Art. 9) does not oblige the States to ensure that churches within their jurisdiction grant religious freedom to their members and servants (cf., e.g., No. 7374/76, Dec. 8.3.76, D.R. 5 p. 157, and No. 12356/86, Dec. 8.9.88, D.R. 57 p. 172). A church is free to enforce uniformity in religious matters, and it is not obliged to accept a pastor as its servant or to allow him to carry out certain duties. The pastor's right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion vis-à-vis the church is guaranteed by his right to leave the church. In the present case, the Marriage Board, an organ of the Pentecostal Movement, has revoked rights previously bestowed upon the Congregation and its pastors on the ground that, in the Board's opinion, they have left the Movement. As regards Andreas, Monika and Miriam Mannerström, they have not specified in what way their rights under Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, 10) have been violated other than the fact that Andreas and Monika Mannerström's marriage, conducted by one of the Congregation's pastors, is not considered to be valid. It is true that after the Marriage Board's decision they could not validly be married by the said pastors. However, marriage is not considered simply as a form of expression of conscience and religion, but is governed by the specific provisions of Article 12 (Art. 12) which refers to the national laws governing the exercise of the right to marry (cf. No. 6167/73, Dec. 18.12.74, D.R. 1 p. 64, and No. 11579/85, Dec. 7.7.86, D.R. 48 p. 253). The Commission, therefore, considers that Andreas, Monika and Miriam Mannerström's rights to freedom of conscience and religion and to freedom of expression have not been affected by any decisions taken in the present case. As regards the other applicants, the Commission finds that the Pentecostal Movement, in the examination of the present complaint, is to be considered as a church. The respondent State have been under no obligation to ensure that the Movement accepts the Congregation or its pastors as its members or grants them any rights deriving from the 1952 Government decision to grant the Movement a right to celebrate marriages. In deciding to revoke the rights previously bestowed upon the Congregation and the pastors, the Marriage Board has acted as an organ of the Movement. As there is no showing that the Congregation or the pastors have been prevented from manifesting their religion or beliefs or from leaving the Movement, neither the Board's decision nor any other acts or decisions by the Movement or State authorities have interfered with the exercise of the Congregation's and the pastors' rights under Article 9 (Art. 9). As regards the Congregation's and its pastors' complaint that there has been a breach of their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 (Art. 10), the Commission considers that the same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the applicants' complaint under this Article as to the complaint under Article 9 (Art. 9) (cf. No. 12356/86, referred to above). Accordingly, there has been no interference with the applicants' rights as guaranteed by Article 10 (Art. 10). It follows that the applicants' complaints under Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, 10) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 3. All applicants claim that they are entitled to a hearing by a tribunal regarding their complaints against the decision by the Marriage Board. They invoke Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, 13) of the Convention. Article 6 (Art. 6) reads in relevant parts as follows: "1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ..." Article 13 (Art. 13) reads as follows: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." The dispute in the present case concerns the Marriage Board's revocation of the Congregation's right to celebrate marriages and the pastors' rights to conduct marriage ceremonies. In determining whether Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) has been violated, the Commission must first consider whether the dispute involves a determination of the applicants' civil rights within the meaning of this provision. The applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) depends on whether there was a dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, and, if so, whether this "right" was of a "civil" character within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). In particular, the dispute must be genuine and serious, it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, p. 19, paras. 66-67). As regards the question whether the dispute relates to a civil right, a tenuous connection or remote consequences do not suffice for the application of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). Civil rights must be the object -or one of the objects - of the dispute; the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for such a right (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 21, para. 47). The Commission recalls that Andreas, Monika and Miriam Mannerström have not been parties to any proceedings regarding the dispute in question, which concerned the rights of the Congregation and its pastors. They were only indirectly affected in the way that the marriage between Andreas and Monika Mannerström, as a consequence of the outcome of the dispute, was considered to be invalid. In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the decisions taken have not been directly decisive for Andreas, Monika and Miriam Mannerström's civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). The applicant pastors maintain that the Marriage Board's decision has violated their right to practise their profession and that it has thus determined their civil rights. The Congregation does not state any separate ground for finding that the Board's decision has involved a determination of civil rights. The Commission recalls that disputes concerning the right to practise a profession or to obtain a licence or an authorisation necessary for such practice have been found to involve a determination of civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., König judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, pp. 31-32, paras. 91-95, and Pudas judgment of 27 October 1987, Series A no. 125-A, p. 16, paras. 37-38). In the present case, however, the revocation of the authorisations to conduct marriage ceremonies has not prevented the pastors from practising their profession, but has merely made it impossible for them to exercise one function of that profession. Moreover, the revocation has not affected the possibilities for the pastors to earn their livelihood. Furthermore, the Commission recalls that it has previously held that disputes on issues of faith and religious practice do not involve the determination of civil rights (cf. No. 7374/76, referred to above). For these reasons, the Commission considers that the Marriage Board's decision has not involved any determination of the Congregation's or the pastors' civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). It follows that the complaints submitted under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention are incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. As to the complaint by all the applicants under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, the Commission recalls that this provision has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as requiring a remedy in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as "arguable" in terms of the Convention (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52). Having regard to its above conclusions in respect of the Convention complaints submitted, the Commission considers that the applicants do not have any "arguable claims" of a violation of the provisions invoked for these complaints. In these circumstances, the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13). It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously, DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber (K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)