AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application No. 23372/94 by Dimitrios LARISSIS against Greece and Application No. 26377/94 by Savvas MANDALARIDIS against Greece and Application No. 26378/94 by Ioannis SARANDIS against Greece The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 27 November 1995, the following members being present: MM. S. TRECHSEL, President H. DANELIUS C.L. ROZAKIS E. BUSUTTIL G. JÖRUNDSSON A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK A. WEITZEL J.-C. SOYER H.G. SCHERMERS Mrs. G.H. THUNE Mr. F. MARTINEZ Mrs. J. LIDDY MM. L. LOUCAIDES J.-C. GEUS M.P. PELLONPÄÄ B. MARXER G.B. REFFI M.A. NOWICKI I. CABRAL BARRETO B. CONFORTI N. BRATZA I. BÉKÉS J. MUCHA E. KONSTANTINOV D. SVÁBY G. RESS A. PERENIC C. BÎRSAN P. LORENZEN K. HERNDL Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission Mr. M. de SALVIA, Deputy Secretary to the Commission Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the applications introduced on 28 January 1994, by Dimitrios LARISSIS, by Savvas MANDALARIDIS, Ioannis SARANDIS against Greece and registered on 1 February 1994 (Applications Nos 26377/94, 26378/94) and 2 February 1994 (Application No. 23372/94) under file Nos 23372/94, 26377/94, 26378/94; Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having regard to : - the Commission's decision of 13 January 1995 to communicate Application No. 23372/94; - the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 22 May 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the first applicant on 19 July 1995; - the Commission's decision of 3 April 1995 to communicate Applications Nos 26377/95 and 26378/95; - the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 7 June 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the second and third applicants on 3 August 1995; Having deliberated; Decides as follows: THE FACTS The first applicant is a Greek citizen and an air-force officer, born in 1949 in Trikala and currently residing in Tanagra Viotias. The second applicant is a Greek citizen and a retired air-force officer, born in 1948 in Ptolemaida and currently residing in Agria Volou. The third applicant is a Greek citizen and an air-force officer, born in 1951 in Grevena and currently residing in Kamatero Attikis. In the proceedings before the Commission they are represented by G. Patsaouras, a lawyer practising in Athens and Prof. Dr. J.W. Montgomery and Mr. P. Diamond, lawyers practising in London. The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows: 1. Particular circumstances of the case On 18 May 1992 the applicants, who are followers of the Pentecostal Church, were tried by the Permanent Air-Force Court (Diarkes Stratodikio Aeroporias) of Athens for proselytism, under Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39, allegedly committed against other members of the air-force and a number of civilians, all of them followers of the Greek Orthodox Church. In a decision delivered on the same day the court rejected an exception raised by the defence as to the unconstitutionality of the law on proselytism. The court found that no issues could arise under the principle nullum crimen sine lege certa as a result of the non- exhaustive enumeration in the criminal statute of the means by which the intrusion on someone else's religious beliefs may be brought about. The court further found the applicants guilty of proselytism. More in particular, the court held in respect of the first applicant the following: "The accused, while he was a military officer, i.e. a pilot officer, serving in Unit X, committed the offence of proselytism in the military camp of this unit between November 1986 and December 1987 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman G. A(ntoniadis), an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, and abusing the trust which G.A, as a hierarchically subordinate, had in him, the accused tried on approximately twenty occasions to persuade G.A to become a member of the sect of the Pentecostal Church by engaging in discussions on theology with him in the course of which the accused contested the correctness of the teachings of the University department of theology concerning God and the Orthodox dogma, encouraged G.A to read the Bible in the light of the accused's own beliefs as a member of the Pentecostal Church, questioned the holy traditions and recommended G.A to visit the church of the Pentecostal sect in Athens. Acting in the same capacity, the accused committed the offence of proselytism between May 1987 and February 1988 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman A. Ko(kkalis), an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, the accused tried on approximately thirty occasions to persuade A.Ko to become a member of the sect of the Church of Pentecost by engaging, persistently and importunately, in discussions with A.Ko on the correctness of the applicant's beliefs as a member of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, questioning the holiness of the Christian Orthodox Church, inviting A.Ko to listen to taped recordings on the beliefs of the Pentecostal sect, taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior and of the naivety and inexperience of A.Ko, a person of young age, and telling him that in the accused's church some persons started speaking foreign languages under the effect of the Holy Power. Acting in the same capacity, the accused committed the offence of proselytism between spring 1989 and 18 August 1989 in the place mentioned above by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman N. Ka(fkas), who served under his orders in the same unit, and taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior, and of the naivety and inexperience of the young man, the accused tried to persuade N.Ka to become a member of the sect of the Church of Pentecost by continually, persistently and importunately expounding on his beliefs concerning the sect of the Pentecostal Church, continually reading and explaining to N.Ka the Bible in the light of the accused's own beliefs and providing N.Ka with copies of a publication of his dogma entitled 'Christianity'. The accused succeeded in converting N.Ka by taking advantage of the latter's inexperience concerning theological matters and the influence he had on N.Ka because of his position and rank." The court also found that the first applicant had engaged in proselytism vis-à-vis another airman, S. V(oikos). In respect of the second applicant the court held the following: "The accused, while he was a military officer, i.e. a flying officer, serving in Unit X, committed the offence of proselytism in the military camp of this unit between November 1986 and December 1987 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; taking advantage of the authority he could exercise because of the difference in rank on airman G. A(ntoniadis), who served in the same unit, the accused tried on approximately seven occasions and on dates which have not been specified to intrude on and change the religious beliefs of G.A by means of skilful discussions with him concerning religion and pressing exhortations; the accused urged G.A to study, because of his youth, nothing but the Gospel where G.A would find the truth which differed from the Orthodox dogma; he also tried to convince G.A by means of a skilful interpretation of extracts from the Holy Gospel, in accordance with the beliefs of the sect of the Pentecost, that the Orthodox faith is not correct, that G.A should adopt the beliefs of the accused, urging him at the same time in a pressing manner to visit while on leave the church of the Pentecostal sect in Athens. The accused also committed the offence of proselytism in Volos in 1988 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; taking advantage of the inexperience and intellectual weakness of A. Z(ounara), he tried on several occasions and on dates which have not been specified to intrude on and change the religious beliefs of A.Z engaging in a skilful analysis of the beliefs of the sect of the Pentecost and of their difference from the Orthodox faith and elaborating on the correctness of the former; he tried persistently to convince A.Z that the followers of the Pentecostal Church bore marks given to them by God, that they could prophesy the future, that A.Z and her children were possessed by the devil, that the devil was fighting to keep control over her, that A.Z worshipped idols and daemons and that the Pentecostal church was the holder of the truth; the accused also urged A.Z in a pressing manner to get baptised and become a member of the Pentecostal Church. The accused also committed the offence of proselytism in Volos on a date which has not been specified towards the beginning of June 1989; the accused, having been summoned by I. B(airamis), another officer, went to the house of A. B(airamis), I.B's brother, where H. A(postolidis, the brother-in-law of I.B and A.B), a follower of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, was in a delirious state under the influence of his religious beliefs foaming, invoking Christ's name and saying 'thank you Christ, because I have known the truth, I see the devil in my wife's and my children's faces'; his mere appearance having calmed H.A, the accused skilfully took advantage of the above-mentioned incident and tried to intrude on and change the religious beliefs of A.B, M. B(airami), S. B(airami), E. B(airami), who were present during the incident and had been impressed by it, and of a number of neighbours who gathered afterwards; the accused preached to them elaborating on the beliefs of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, telling them, among others, that their church was the correct one and not the Orthodox religion, that in 1992 the world would come to an end and the church would be 'captured'; the accused urged them persistently and importunately to believe in the true Christ and told them that, by virtue of being Christian Orthodox, they had taken sides with the devil." In respect of the third applicant the court held the following: "The accused, while he was a military officer, i.e. a pilot officer, serving in Unit X, committed the offence of proselytism in the military camp of this unit between May 1987 and February 1988 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman A. Ko(kkalis), an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, and taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior, the accused tried more than fifty times to convince A.Ko that the teachings of the Orthodox faith were not correct on a number of issues, such as the virginity of the Holy Mother, the ranks of the priests, the power of the Holy Spirit etc.; the accused would engage with A.Ko in persistent and importunate discussions regarding the teachings of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, of which the accused was a follower, he would tell A.Ko that the teachings of the sect and not those of the Orthodox Church were correct and he would urge A.Ko to visit a place in Larissa where the followers of the Pentecostal Church used to gather and to become a member; the accused also gave A.Ko a free copy of a periodical published by the followers of the Pentecostal Church entitled 'Christianity'; in the course of the above-mentioned encounters the accused intentionally failed to reveal to A.Ko that he was a member of the Pentecostal sect. Acting in the same capacity the accused committed the offence of proselytism in the same place for a period of four to five months in 1998 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of A. Z(ounara), an Orthodox Christian, and skilfully taking advantage of her inexperience in religious matters and her intellectual weakness, which resulted from her low level of education, the accused tried importunately to persuade A.Z to be baptised and become a member of the sect of the Pentecostal Church telling her constantly that he bore signs given to him by God, that he could tell the future and that she and her children were possessed; the accused intended to undermine A.Z's faith in Orthodoxy and convert her to the sect of the Pentecostal Church. Acting in the same capacity the accused committed the offence of proselytism in the same place between spring 1989 and 18 August 1989 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman N. Ka(fkas), an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, and taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior and of the naivety and inexperience of N.Ka, the accused tried to persuade N.Ka to adhere to the sect of the Pentecostal Church; the accused would engage in continual, persistent and importunate analysis of his beliefs regarding the sect of the Pentecostal Church, read to N.Ka continually the Gospel which the accused would interpret in accordance with his own beliefs, give to N.Ka publications of his sect and take N.Ka to his place of worship; the accused succeeded in converting N.Ka taking advantage of his inexperience concerning religious matters and the influence he had on N.Ka because of his position and rank." The court also found that the third applicant had engaged in proselytism vis-à-vis a warrant officer, Th. T(sikas). The court imposed on the first applicant the penalties of five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of G. A(ntoniadis), five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Ko(kkalis), five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of S. V(oikos) and seven months' imprisonment for the proselytism of N. Ka(fkas). The court ordered the first applicant to serve an overall sentence of thirteen months' imprisonment. On the second applicant the court imposed the penalties of five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of G. A(ntoniadis), five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Z(ounara), and eight months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. B(airamis, M. B(airami) and the others. The court ordered the second applicant to serve an overall sentence of twelve months' imprisonment. On the third applicant the court imposed the penalties of eight months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Ko(kkalis), five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Z(ounara), five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of Th. T(sikas) and seven months' imprisonment for the proselytism of N. Ka(fkas). The court ordered the third applicant to serve an overall sentence of fourteen months' imprisonment. Finally, the court ordered that the penalties should be converted to fines and that they should not be enforced provided that the applicants did not commit new criminal offences in the following three years. The applicant appealed immediately before the Courts-Martial Appeal Court (Anatheoritiko Dikastirio). Their appeal was heard on 7 October 1992. In a judgment pronounced on the same day the appeal court rejected a plea raised by the defence to the effect that the accused had merely exercised a constitutional right. It also upheld most of the applicants' convictions, using the same reasoning as the first instance court. It reversed, however, the conviction of the first applicant for the proselytism of S. V(oikos) and that of the third applicant for the proselytism of Th. T(sikas). The appeal court imposed on the first and third applicants in respect of the convictions it had upheld the same penalties as the first instance court. However, their overall sentences were reduced to eleven and twelve months' imprisonment respectively. The second applicant's penalties were reduced by the appeal court to four months' imprisonment for the proselytism of G. A(ntoniadis), four months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Z(ounara), and six months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. B(airamis), M. B(airami) and the others. His overall sentence was reduced to ten months' imprisonment. As none of the overall sentences imposed involved more than one year's imprisonment, the court pronounced that they were automatically converted into pecuniary penalties of 1,000 drachmas per day. The court finally ordered that the penalties should not be enforced provided that the applicants did not commit new criminal offences in the following three years. The applicant appealed in cassation. In a judgment delivered on 30 July 1993 the Court of Cassation (Arios Pagos) considered that the crime of proselytism was committed when a person attempted to intrude directly or indirectly on the religious beliefs of a person of different religious convictions, with the aim of undermining them, using one of the indicatively enumerated means in the relevant criminal provision. Article 4 of Law 1363/38 was found to be fully in accordance with the provisions of the Greek Constitution which guarantee the principle nullum crimen sine lege certa and the right to religious freedom. It was also found to be in accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, since it did not purport to criminalise religious beliefs, but only the attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of someone else with the aim of changing them. As a result, the court rejected the applicant's plea that the law was unconstitutional. As regards the particular circumstances of the case, the court considered that the military courts had correctly interpreted and applied Article 4 of Law 1363/38 when they convicted the applicants using the particular reasoning. The court rejected the applicant's appeal. 2. Relevant Domestic Law Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39, provides as follows: 1. Anyone engaging in proselytism shall be liable to imprisonment and a fine of between 1,000 drachmas and 50,000 drachmas; he shall, moreover, be subject to police supervision for a period of between six months and one year to be fixed by the court when convicting the offender. The term of imprisonment may not be commuted to a fine. 2. By 'proselytism' is meant, in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion (eterodoxos), with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety. 3. The commission of such an offence in a school or other educational establishment or philanthropic institution shall constitute a particularly aggravating circumstance." COMPLAINTS The applicants complain of their conviction for proselytism under Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39. They invoke Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION Application No. 23372/94 was introduced on 28 January 1994 and registered on 2 February 1994. On 13 January 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government for observations on the admissibility and merits. On 22 May 1995 the Government submitted their observations after an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose. The applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 19 July 1995. Applications Nos. 26377/95 and 26378/95 were introduced on 28 January 1994 and registered on 1 February 1995. On 3 April 1995 the Commission decided to communicate these applications to the respondent Government for observations on the admissibility and merits. On 7 June 1995 the Government submitted their observations. The applicants' observations in reply were submitted on 3 August 1995. THE LAW 1. The Commission, having regard to the connection between the three cases and the similar nature of the issues raised, considers it appropriate to order the joinder of the present applications under Rule 35 of its Rules of Procedure. 2. The applicants complain of their conviction for proselytism under Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39. They rely on Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 (Art. 7, 9, 10, 14) of the Convention. Insofar as relevant, these provisions read as follows: Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. ...." Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. .... 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." The respondent Government submit that the applicants' conviction was in accordance with Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention and was "prescribed by law" within the meaning of Articles 9 para. 2 and Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 9-2, 10-2) of the Convention. They refer to the judgment of 25 May 1993 of the Court in the Kokkinakis case (Series A no. 260) and specify that, although Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39, does not contain an exhaustive enumeration of the means by which the offence of proselytism may be committed, this is necessary to avoid excessive rigidity and keep pace with changing circumstances. Moreover, the letter of the provision is supplemented by a body of settled national case-law, which is mentioned in the Court's judgment in the Kokkinakis case. The Government further argue that, as it was accepted by the Court in its judgment in the Kokkinakis case, the aim of the law on proselytism is "the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" within the meaning of Articles 9 para. 2 and 10 para. 2 (Art. 9-2, 10-2) of the Convention. In the particular circumstances, the conviction of the applicants also served another legitimate aim under the above-mentioned Convention provisions, the protection of public safety and order. The Government submit that the prevention of disorder in the armed forces is indispensable for the general public safety and order. The applicants' conviction was intended to preserve peace and cohesion among soldiers and by extension safety in the armed forces. The Government submit that there is no place in the armed forces for the heated discussions and animosity which may be caused by attempts to change the religious beliefs of subordinates. The Government contend that, since Article 4 of Law 1363/38 punishes improper proselytism only, it is fully compatible with Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, as interpreted in Kokkinakis. As regards the particular circumstances of the cases, the Government claim that they could be distinguished from those of the Kokkinakis case. First, the applicants were military officers, who were subject to special conditions and had specific "duties" and "responsibilities" within the meaning of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention which could justify wider restrictions on their Convention rights. More in particular, young persons under their command or persons who were vulnerable and intellectually weak, because of their social status, difficult family circumstances and low level of education, were liable to attach special weight to the applicants' views, because of the applicants' professional capacity. Secondly, the applicants engaged themselves in more than one act of proselytism over a long period of time and were so persistent and systematic that their attempt to change their victims' religious beliefs could be assimilated to an attack. Thirdly, the offences took place in military premises when the applicants and quite often their victims were on duty. The Government submit that the applicants' convictions were necessary in a democratic society because the applicants took advantage of the influence which officers by definition have over ordinary soldiers and of the confidence which young soldiers have in them. The Government refer in this connection to the special relations of dependency which are created in the military forces, as a result of the strict hierarchical structure of the army, and which do not permit the development of a free dialogue on an equal basis between an officer and a subordinate. They rely in this respect to the testimonies of G. A(ntoniadis), A. Ko(kkalis), A. Ka(fkas), N. Ka(fkas) and I. B(airamis). The second and third applicants also took advantage of the psychological problems which difficult family circumstances had created to A. Z(ounara), her level of education and the respect she had for military officers. The Government refer in this connection to the statement of A.Z before the investigating judge. The Government, finally, stress that the requirement of proportionality in Articles 9 para. 2 and 10 para. 2 (Art. 9-2, 10-2) of the Convention could not have been breached, since the penalty imposed at first instance had been suspended and the penalty imposed on appeal was first converted into a fine and then suspended. The applicants submit that the ambiguous, vague and overbroad language of Article 4 of Law 1363/38 is not compatible with the requirement of legal certainty under Article 7 and Articles 9 para. 2 and 10 para. 2 (Art. 7, 9-2, 10-2) of the Convention. The case-law relied on by the Government proves that any form of evangelism could be considered to be a crime by the Greek courts. This case-law left the applicants in doubt as to whether they could give testimony with impunity of their faith to their colleagues. The applicants further argue that the Greek law on proselytism is fundamentally incompatible with the Convention, because of its chilling effect on the rights guaranteed under Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, 10) thereof. The applicants contend that their convictions were not necessary in a democratic society. They consider that the thrust of the Court's judgment in the Kokkinakis case is to place the heaviest burden on the State that wishes to justify restrictions on religious freedom. Yet, the domestic courts have failed to substantiate in their decisions the use of improper means on the part of the applicants on either the airmen or civilians. The applicants also argue that it is difficult to imagine a pressing social need capable of restricting the freedom to engage in responsible religious evangelism as exercised by adherents of mainline Christian denominations, such as the Pentecostal Church. As regards their convictions for the proselytism of airmen, the applicants stress that they only had informal discussions with them. Such discussions had not been made a compulsory part of military training. No sanctions were imposed or threatened to the airmen who did not accept the viewpoint of the applicants or refused to listen to them, nor was any inducement offered. The fact that the discussions were held between a superior and a subordinate could not justify in itself the limitation of the applicants' rights. Most social structures in modern societies are hierarchical and, if States were permitted to criminalise religious discussions between a superior and a subordinate, religious freedom would be seriously undermined. Moreover, the airmen in question were sufficiently mature to die for their country, so a fortiori they were sufficiently mature to discuss and take decisions for themselves in regard to religious matters. Furthermore, the applicants argue that the religious discussions in question did not prevent the applicants from discharging their military functions. The religious beliefs of the applicants, not being pacifist, were not in any sense dangerous to military efficiency. The Government has not demonstrated that the presentation of the applicants' faith would necessarily produce military and social anarchy. As regards the facts of each case of alleged proselytism, the applicants stress that G. A(ntoniadis) testified, in respect of the only incident of alleged proselytism identifiable in place and time, that he was approached by the first applicant "after hours". G.A's subjective fear is not backed by any subjective evidence. All airmen were able to refuse the applicants' advances without any consequences. N. Ka(fkas)'s own testimony, which exonerates the first and third applicants, is to be preferred to that of his father A. Ka(fkas), which is hearsay. A. Z(ounara) was not cross-examined by the defence. In any event, her statement does not refer to any coercion on the part of the second or third applicants nor does it disclose any intellectual weakness on her part. The difference in social status between the second and third applicants and her cannot form the basis for limiting the Convention rights of the former. Her psychological problems were not the result of proselytism, but of her family break-up. There is no evidence to associate the latter with the second and third applicants' evangelistic activities. In any event, A.Z proved to be in control of the situation and, exercising her free will, she severed all contact with the two applicants. Finally, the applicants argue that the imposition of a criminal penalty, even when limited or commuted to a pecuniary fine, constituted a disproportionate interference with their rights under the Convention. In the light of the parties' observations, the Commission considers that the applications raise serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. The applications cannot, therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established. For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously ORDERS THE JOINDER OF APPLICATIONS NOS. 23372/94, 26377/95 and 26378/95; by a majority DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case. Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission (H.C. KRÜGER) (S. TRECHSEL)