EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Applications Nos. 23372/94, 26377/94 and 26378/94 Dimitrios Larissis, Savvas Mandalaridis and Ioannis Sarandis against Greece REPORT OF THE COMMISSION (adopted on 12 September 1996) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-19). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 A. The application (paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 B. The proceedings (paras. 5-14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 C. The present Report (paras. 15-19). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 20-42) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 A. The particular circumstances of the case (paras. 20-41). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 B. Relevant domestic law (para. 42). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 43-105). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A. Complaints declared admissible (para. 43). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B. Points at issue (para. 44). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 C. As regards Article 9 of the Convention (paras. 45-82). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Whether the interference was "prescribed by law" (paras. 47-50). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim (paras. 51-54). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. Whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" (paras. 55-82). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 i. The conviction of the second applicant for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours and the conviction of the second and third applicants for the proselytism of A. Zounara (paras. 72-74). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 CONCLUSION (paras. 75-76). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 ii. The conviction of the first and second applicants forthe proselytism of airman G. Antoniadis, the conviction of the first and third applicants for the proselytism of airmen A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas (paras. 77-80). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 CONCLUSION (paras. 81-82). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 D. As regards Article 7 of the Convention (paras. 83-86). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 CONCLUSION (para. 87). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 E. As regards Article 10 of the Convention (paras. 88-90). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CONCLUSION (para. 91). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 F. As regards Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention (paras. 92-95). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CONCLUSION (paras. 96-97). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 G. Recapitulation (paras. 98-105) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 PARTIALLY CONCURRING AND PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. H.G. SCHERMERS, C.L. ROZAKIS, M.A. NOWICKI, B. CONFORTI AND N. BRATZA . . . 25 PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. F. MARTINEZ JOINED BY Mrs. G.H. THUNE AND MM. E. BUSUTTIL, J.-C. GEUS AND A. PERENIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 APPENDIX I: DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . 28 APPENDIX II: EXTRACTS FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK TEXT OF THE COURT JUDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . 41 I.INTRODUCTION 1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission. A. The application 2. The applicants are Greek citizens, born in 1949, 1948 and 1951 respectively and resident in Tanagra Viotias, Agria Volou and Kamatero Attikis respectively. They were represented before the Commission by Prof. Dr. J.W. Montgomery, a barrister practising in London, Mr. G. Patsaouras, a lawyer practising in Athens, and Mr. P. Diamond, a barrister practising in London. 3. The application is directed against Greece. The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. L. Papidas, President of the Legal Advisory Council of the State (Nomiko Simvulio tu Kratus), Dr. P. Kamarineas, Member (Simvulos) of the Legal Advisory Council of the State, Mr. M. Apessos, Senior Adviser (Paredros) of the Legal Advisory Council of the State, and Mrs. K. Grigoriu, Legal Assistant (Dikastikos Antiprosopos) of the Legal Advisory Council of the State. 4. The case concerns the applicants' conviction for proselytism. The applicants invoke Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention. B. The proceedings 5. Application No. 23372/94 was introduced on 28 January 1994 and registered on 2 February 1994. 6. On 13 January 1995 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits. 7. The Government's observations were submitted on 22 May 1995 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose. The applicant replied on 19 July 1995. 8. Applications Nos. 26377/95 and 26378/95 were introduced on 28 January 1994 and registered on 1 February 1995. 9. On 3 April 1995 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the two applications to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on their admissibility and merits. 10. The Government's observations were submitted on 7 June 1995. The two applicants replied on 19 July 1995. 11. On 7 July 1995 the Commission granted the three applicants legal aid for the presentation of their cases. 12. On 27 November 1995 the Commission ordered the joinder of the three applications. It also declared the applications admissible. 13. The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 6 December 1995 and they were invited to submit such further information or observations on the merits as they wished. The applicants submitted additional observations on 23 January 1996. The respondent Government did not. 14. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement. In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected. C. The present Report 15. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present: Mr. S. TRECHSEL, President Mrs. G.H. THUNE Mrs. J. LIDDY MM. E. BUSUTTIL G. JÖRUNDSSON A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK A. WEITZEL J.-C. SOYER H.G. SCHERMERS H. DANELIUS F. MARTINEZ C.L. ROZAKIS L. LOUCAIDES J.-C. GEUS M.P. PELLONPÄÄ G.B. REFFI M.A. NOWICKI I. CABRAL BARRETO B. CONFORTI N. BRATZA I. BÉKÉS J. MUCHA D. SVÁBY G. RESS A. PERENIC C. BÎRSAN P. LORENZEN K. HERNDL E. BIELIUNAS 16. The text of this Report was adopted on 12 September 1996 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention. 17. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is: (i) to establish the facts, and (ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention. 18. The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the applications is annexed hereto. 19. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission. II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS A. The particular circumstances of the case 20. On 18 May 1992 the applicants, who are followers of the Pentecostal Church, appeared before the Permanent Air-Force Court (Diarkes Stratodikio Aeroporias) of Athens, composed of one officer with legal training and four other officers. They were tried for proselytism, under Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39, allegedly committed against other members of the air-force and a number of civilians, all of them followers of the Greek Orthodox Church. 21. The court heard a number of witnesses, among whom A. Kafkas and I. Stamoulis. A. Kafkas testified that when his son, N. Kafkas, joined the air-force he was Christian Orthodox. When he completed his military service he was Pentecostal. N. Kafkas had served in Unit X under the orders of the third applicant. A short while after N. Kafkas joined Unit X, his behaviour changed. He stopped seeing his friends and used to spend long periods of time in his room studying the Bible. When asked by the witness, N. Kafkas said that he had met two officers who were real Christians and used to study the Bible, as opposed to the witness who was not a real Christian. The witness subsequently found out that it had been the first applicant who had persuaded N. Kafkas to stop wearing a cross. N. Kafkas brought back home from the barracks his television and radio sets, because it was forbidden by the two officers' religion to watch television and listen to the radio. N. Kafkas also brought back home the books from which he used to study to prepare for a set of examinations necessary for admission to university. Instead he would read religious books and listen to taped sermons, which the first and third applicants had given to him. Every evening and every Sunday morning N. Kafkas used to leave his house in order to meet the persons who had changed his religion. When his parents followed him to the Pentecostal church, he left his home and went to Athens. Twenty days later N. Kafkas returned home and to the Orthodox Church. When asked by the witness, N. Kafkas said that the first and third applicants had converted him to the Pentecostal Church. They had taken advantage of their rank to exert pressure on him using their special skills of persuasion. They would tell N. Kafkas that he would be given leave of absence if he promised to visit their church. When the witness left on a trip, N. Kafkas was reconverted to the Pentecostal Church. The witness concluded that his son, N. Kafkas, had no will of his own and always did as he was told by other members of the Pentecostal Church. 22. I. Stamoulis, a retired air-force officer, testified that the first and third applicants served under his orders when he was the commander of Unit X. The second applicant did not. When asked by the witness, both applicants accepted that they were followers of the Pentecostal Church but claimed that they did not engage in proselytism. However, various persons denounced to the witness the proselytising activities of the first and third applicants. Th. Tsikas told him that the two applicants used to choose airmen because they were more vulnerable as a result of their age and that the two applicants took advantage of their rank. A. Kafkas had called the witness on the phone and had told him that the two applicants had converted his son, N. Kafkas, while he was doing his military service. The witness was convinced that N. Kafkas had been proselytised by the first and third applicants because he used to work in the office where the two applicants served as duty officers. The witness considered that the first and third applicants were excellent officers. He did not know what means they had used to proselytise. Neither did the previous commander of the unit, whom the witness had asked. 23. The court also read the statement taken by the investigation judge from N. Kafkas who had been summoned to appear as a prosecution witness. According to the testimony of A. Kafkas, N. Kafkas could not attend the hearing before the first instance court because his wife was undergoing surgery on that day. 24. In a decision delivered on the day of the hearing the first instance court rejected an exception raised by the defence as to the unconstitutionality of the law on proselytism. The court found that no issues could arise under the principle nullum crimen sine lege certa as a result of the non-exhaustive enumeration in the criminal statute of the means by which the intrusion on someone else's religious beliefs may be brought about. The court further found the applicants guilty of proselytism. More in particular, the court held in respect of the first applicant the following: "The accused, while he was a military officer, ..., serving in Unit X, committed the offence of proselytism in the military camp of this unit between November 1986 and December 1987 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman G. Antoniadis, an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, and abusing the trust which G. Antoniadis, as a hierarchically subordinate, had in him, the accused tried on approximately twenty occasions to persuade G. Antoniadis to become a member of the sect of the Pentecostal Church by engaging in discussions on theology with him in the course of which the accused contested the correctness of the teachings of the University department of theology concerning God and the Orthodox dogma, encouraged G. Antoniadis to read the Bible in the light of the accused's own beliefs as a member of the Pentecostal Church, questioned the holy traditions and recommended G. Antoniadis to visit the church of the Pentecostal sect in Athens. Acting in the same capacity, the accused committed the offence of proselytism between May 1987 and February 1988 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman A. Kokkalis, an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, the accused tried on approximately thirty occasions to persuade A. Kokkalis to become a member of the sect of the Church of Pentecost by engaging, persistently and importunately, in discussions with A. Kokkalis on the correctness of the accused's beliefs as a member of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, questioning the holiness of the Christian Orthodox Church, inviting A. Kokkalis to listen to taped recordings on the beliefs of the Pentecostal sect, taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior and of the naivety and inexperience of A. Kokkalis, a person of young age, and telling him that in the accused's church some persons started speaking foreign languages under the effect of the Holy Power. Acting in the same capacity, the accused committed the offence of proselytism between spring 1989 and 18 August 1989 in the place mentioned above by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman N. Kafkas, who served under his orders in the same unit, and taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior, and of the naivety and inexperience of the young man, the accused tried to persuade N. Kafkas to become a member of the sect of the Church of Pentecost by continually, persistently and importunately expounding on his beliefs concerning the sect of the Pentecostal Church, continually reading and explaining to N. Kafkas the Bible in the light of the accused's own beliefs and providing N. Kafkas with copies of a publication of his dogma entitled 'Christianity'. The accused succeeded in converting N. Kafkas by taking advantage of the latter's inexperience concerning theological matters and the influence he had on N. Kafkas because of his position and rank." 25. The court also found that the first applicant had engaged in proselytism vis-à-vis another airman, S. Voikos. 26. In respect of the second applicant the court held the following: "The accused, while he was a military officer, ..., serving in Unit X, committed the offence of proselytism in the military camp of this unit between November 1986 and December 1987 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; taking advantage of the authority he could exercise because of the difference in rank on airman G. Antoniadis, who served in the same unit, the accused tried on approximately seven occasions and on dates which have not been specified to intrude on and change the religious beliefs of G. Antoniadis by means of skilful discussions with him concerning religion and pressing exhortations; the accused urged G. Antoniadis to study, because of his youth, nothing but the Gospel where G. Antoniadis would find the truth which differed from the Orthodox dogma; he also tried to convince G. Antoniadis by means of a skilful interpretation of extracts from the Holy Gospel, in accordance with the beliefs of the sect of the Pentecost, that the Orthodox faith is not correct, that G. Antoniadis should adopt the beliefs of the accused, urging him at the same time in a pressing manner to visit while on leave the church of the Pentecostal sect in Athens. The accused also committed the offence of proselytism in Volos in 1988 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; taking advantage of the inexperience and intellectual weakness of A. Zounara, he tried on several occasions and on dates which have not been specified to intrude on and change the religious beliefs of A. Zounara engaging in a skilful analysis of the beliefs of the sect of the Pentecost and of their difference from the Orthodox faith and elaborating on the correctness of the former; he tried persistently to convince A. Zounara that the followers of the Pentecostal Church bore marks given to them by God, that they could prophesy the future, that A. Zounara and her children were possessed by the devil, that the devil was fighting to keep control over her, that A. Zounara worshipped idols and daemons and that the Pentecostal church was the holder of the truth; the accused also urged A. Zounara in a pressing manner to get baptised and become a member of the Pentecostal Church. The accused also committed the offence of proselytism in Volos on a date which has not been specified towards the beginning of June 1989; the accused, having been summoned by I. Bairamis, another officer, went to the house of A. Bairamis, I. Bairamis's brother, where H. Apostolidis, the brother-in-law of I. and A. Bairamis, a follower of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, was in a delirious state under the influence of his religious beliefs foaming, invoking Christ's name and saying 'thank you Christ, because I have known the truth, I see the devil in my wife's and my children's faces'; his mere appearance having calmed H. Apostolidis, the accused skilfully took advantage of the above-mentioned incident and tried to intrude on and change the religious beliefs of A. Bairamis, M. Bairami, S. Bairami, E. Bairami, who were present during the incident and had been impressed by it, and of a number of neighbours who gathered afterwards; the accused preached to them elaborating on the beliefs of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, telling them, among others, that their church was the correct one and not the Orthodox religion, that in 1992 the world would come to an end and the church would be 'captured'; the accused urged them persistently and importunately to believe in the true Christ and told them that, by virtue of being Christian Orthodox, they had taken sides with the devil." 27. In respect of the third applicant the court held the following: "The accused, while he was a military officer, ..., serving in Unit X, committed the offence of proselytism in the military camp of this unit between May 1987 and February 1988 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman A. Kokkalis, an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, and taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior, the accused tried more than fifty times to convince A. Kokkalis that the teachings of the Orthodox faith were not correct on a number of issues, such as the virginity of the Holy Mother, the ranks of the priests, the power of the Holy Spirit etc.; the accused would engage with A. Kokkalis in persistent and importunate discussions regarding the teachings of the sect of the Pentecostal Church, of which the accused was a follower, he would tell A. Kokkalis that the teachings of the sect and not those of the Orthodox Church were correct and he would urge A. Kokkalis to visit a place in Larissa where the followers of the Pentecostal Church used to gather and to become a member; the accused also gave A. Kokkalis a free copy of a periodical published by the followers of the Pentecostal Church entitled 'Christianity'; in the course of the above-mentioned encounters the accused intentionally failed to reveal to A. Kokkalis that he was a member of the Pentecostal sect. Acting in the same capacity the accused committed the offence of proselytism in the same place for a period of four to five months in 1988 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of A. Zounara, an Orthodox Christian, and skilfully taking advantage of her inexperience in religious matters and her intellectual weakness, which resulted from her low level of education, the accused tried importunately to persuade A. Zounara to be baptised and become a member of the sect of the Pentecostal Church telling her constantly that he bore signs given to him by God, that he could tell the future and that she and her children were possessed; the accused intended to undermine A. Zounara's faith in Orthodoxy and convert her to the sect of the Pentecostal Church. Acting in the same capacity the accused committed the offence of proselytism in the same place between spring 1989 and 18 August 1989 by engaging in several acts which, however, gave rise to a single, albeit continuing, breach of the relevant criminal provision; acting with the aim of intruding on and changing the religious beliefs of airman N. Kafkas, an Orthodox Christian who served in the same unit, and taking advantage of the trust inherent in a relationship between a subordinate and a superior and of the naivety and inexperience of N. Kafkas, the accused tried to persuade N. Kafkas to adhere to the sect of the Pentecostal Church; the accused would engage in continual, persistent and importunate analysis of his beliefs regarding the sect of the Pentecostal Church, read to N. Kafkas continually the Gospel which the accused would interpret in accordance with his own beliefs, give to N. Kafkas publications of his sect and take N. Kafkas to his place of worship; the accused succeeded in converting N. Kafkas taking advantage of his inexperience concerning religious matters and the influence he had on N. Kafkas because of his position and rank." 28. The court also found that the third applicant had engaged in proselytism vis-à-vis a warrant officer, Th. Tsikas. 29. The court imposed on the first applicant the penalties of five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis, five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis, five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of S. Voikos and seven months' imprisonment for the proselytism of N. Kafkas. The court ordered the first applicant to serve an overall sentence of thirteen months' imprisonment. 30. On the second applicant the court imposed the penalties of five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis, five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Zounara, and eight months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Bairamis, M. Bairami and the others. The court ordered the second applicant to serve an overall sentence of twelve months' imprisonment. 31. On the third applicant the court imposed the penalties of eight months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis, five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Zounara, five months' imprisonment for the proselytism of Th. Tsikas and seven months' imprisonment for the proselytism of N. Kafkas. The court ordered the third applicant to serve an overall sentence of fourteen months' imprisonment. 32. Finally, the court ordered that the penalties should be converted to fines and that they should not be enforced provided that the applicants did not commit new criminal offences in the following three years. 33. The applicants appealed immediately to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court (Anatheoritiko Dikastirio), being a court composed of five military judges. Their appeal was heard on 7 October 1992. 34. The appeal court heard a number of witnesses among whom I. Stamoulis who repeated what he had testified before the first instance court. The court also heard N. Kafkas who testified that he had served between the winter of 1988 and August 1989 in Unit X under the orders of the first and third applicants. The two applicants did not put any pressure on the witness to become a member of the Pentecostal Church. The witness had himself approached the third applicant and asked him why he was so peaceful. The third applicant replied that this was the result of reading the Gospel. The two applicants were not importunate towards the witness. They had simply suggested to him that he read the Bible. When the witness did so, he realised a number of points of divergence between the teachings of the Orthodox Church and the Bible. The witness did not have any discussions with the first and third applicants concerning the Orthodox and Pentecostal Church. The witness simply turned to the two applicants when he had any questions concerning the Bible and always found their replies convincing. The two applicants never gave him any Pentecostal literature to read. They never told the witness to go to the Pentecostal church. The third applicant, who was responsible for the witness, never authorised the witness's absence from the air-force. The witness went to the Pentecostal church for the first time in September 1989 after he had been discharged from the armed forces. The witness had never heard that the first and third applicants had approached other airmen in order to talk to them about their religion. The witness never told his father, A. Kafkas, that the first and third applicants had proselytised him. A. Kafkas's testimony was false. 35. The appeal court also read the record of the hearing before the first instance court, including the testimony of the various witnesses. It also read a number of statements taken by the investigating judge, among which the statements of A. Kafkas, who had not been summoned to appear as a witness before the appeal court. In his statement to the investigating judge, A. Kafkas had mentioned, inter alia, that his son, N. Kafkas, when discharged from the armed forces, had brought home, together with his personal belongings, a number of issues of the periodical "Christianity" which had been published while N. Kafkas was in the armed forces. N. Kafkas had told A. Kafkas that the officers with whom N. Kafkas had been serving in the armed forces had suggested to N. Kafkas to take off the cross he used to wear. N. Kafkas failed to give A. Kafkas any explanations why he had brought back home his television and radio sets. In December 1989 N. Kafkas told A. Kafkas that he had been proselytised by the first and third applicants. A. Kafkas had found the telephone numbers of some officers in his son's Bible. He then inquired and found out the names of the remaining officers. A. Kafkas had initially objected to his son's being called to testify, but then withdrew his objection. 36. In a judgment pronounced immediately after the hearing the appeal court rejected a plea raised by the defence to the effect that the accused had merely exercised a constitutional right. It also upheld most of the applicants' convictions, using the same reasoning as the first instance court. It reversed, however, the conviction of the first applicant for the proselytism of S. Voikos and that of the third applicant for the proselytism of Th. Tsikas. 37. The appeal court imposed on the first and third applicants in respect of the convictions it had upheld the same penalties as the first instance court. However, their overall sentences were reduced to eleven and twelve months' imprisonment respectively. The second applicant's penalties were reduced by the appeal court to four months' imprisonment for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis, four months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Zounara, and six months' imprisonment for the proselytism of A. Bairamis, M. Bairami and the others. His overall sentence was reduced to ten months' imprisonment. 38. As none of the overall sentences imposed involved more than one year's imprisonment, they were automatically converted by the court into pecuniary penalties of 1,000 drachmas per day. The court finally ordered that the penalties should not be enforced provided that the applicants did not commit new criminal offences in the following three years. 39. The applicants appealed in cassation. In a judgment delivered on 30 July 1993 the Court of Cassation (Arios Pagos) considered that the crime of proselytism was committed when a person attempted to intrude directly or indirectly on the religious beliefs of a person of different religious convictions, with the aim of undermining them, using one of the indicatively enumerated means in the relevant criminal provision. 40. Article 4 of Law 1363/38 was found to be fully in accordance with the provisions of the Greek Constitution which guarantee the principle nullum crimen sine lege certa and the right to religious freedom. It was also found to be in accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, since it did not purport to criminalise religious beliefs, but only the attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of someone else with the aim of changing them; such an attempt is fully inconsistent with religious freedom which creates an obligation to respect the religious beliefs of every person of a different religious persuasion. As a result, the court rejected the applicant's plea that the law was unconstitutional. 41. As regards the particular circumstances of the case, the court considered that the military courts had correctly interpreted and applied Article 4 of Law 1363/38 when they convicted the applicants using the particular reasoning. The court rejected the applicant's appeal. B. Relevant domestic law 42. Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39, provides as follows: "1. Anyone engaging in proselytism shall be liable to imprisonment and a fine of between 1,000 drachmas and 50,000 drachmas; he shall, moreover, be subject to police supervision for a period of between six months and one year to be fixed by the court when convicting the offender. The term of imprisonment may not be commuted to a fine. 2. By 'proselytism' is meant, in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion (eterodoxos), with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety. 3. The commission of such an offence in a school or other educational establishment or philanthropic institution shall constitute a particularly aggravating circumstance." III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION A. Complaints declared admissible 43. The Commission has declared admissible the applicants' complaints that the Greek law on proselytism on the basis of which they were convicted was not lex certa, that their convictions constituted unjustified interferences with their rights to freedom of religion and expression and that they were subjected to discrimination in the enjoyment of their right to freedom of religion. B. Points at issue 44. The Commission considers that these complaints fall to be divided into two groups. The first group concerns the conviction of the applicants for proselytism of military personnel of their unit; the second group concerns the convictions of applicants for proselytism of civilians. For both these groups, the points at issue are therefore - whether there has been a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention - whether there has been a violation of Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention - whether there has been a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention and - whether there has been a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9). C. As regards Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention 45. Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention provides as follows: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 46. The Commission considers that the applicants' convictions for proselytism and the penalties they received in that connection amount to an interference with their right to "freedom to manifest (their) religion or belief". Such an interference is contrary to Article 9 (Art. 9) unless it is "prescribed by law", directed at one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 and is "necessary in a democratic society" for achieving them. 1. Whether the interference was "prescribed by law" 47. The applicants submit that the ambiguous, vague and overbroad language of Article 4 of Law 1363/38 is not compatible with the requirement of legal certainty under Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention. The case-law relied on by the Government proves that any form of evangelism could be considered to be a crime by the Greek courts. This case-law left the applicants in doubt as to whether they could give testimony with impunity of their faith to their colleagues, especially since there were no decisions concerning members of the armed forces. 48. The respondent Government submit that the applicants' conviction was "prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention. They refer to the judgment of 25 May 1993 of the Court in the Kokkinakis case and specify that, although Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as amended by Law 1672/39, does not contain an exhaustive enumeration of the means by which the offence of proselytism may be committed, this is necessary to avoid excessive rigidity and keep pace with changing circumstances. Moreover, the letter of the provision is supplemented by a body of settled national case-law, which is mentioned in the Court's judgment in the Kokkinakis case. 49. The Commission recalls that in its Kokkinakis judgment of 25 May 1993 the European Court of Human Rights noted that, in order to avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace with changing circumstances, many criminal statutes are inevitably couched in terms which are, to a greater or lesser extent, vague. Although the Greek law on proselytism fell within that category of criminal statutes, the Court considered that the letter of Article 4 of Law 1363/38 was supplemented by a body of settled case-law which was published and which was such as to enable the applicant of that case to regulate his conduct in the matter (Eur. Court H.R., Kokkinakis judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260, p. 17, para. 31, and p. 19, para. 40). 50. The Commission does not consider that the submissions of the parties contain any elements which would justify a different conclusion in the applicants' case. It follows that the measure in question was prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention. 2. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim 51. The applicants have not made any particular submissions in this connection. 52. The Government argue that, as it was accepted by the Court in its Kokkinakis judgment, the aim of the law on proselytism is "the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention. In the particular circumstances, the conviction of the applicants also served another legitimate aim, the protection of public safety and order. The Government submit that the prevention of disorder in the armed forces is indispensable for the general public safety and order. The applicants' conviction was intended to preserve peace and cohesion among soldiers and by extension safety in the armed forces. The Government further contend that there is no place in the armed forces for the heated discussions and animosity which may be caused by attempts to change the religious beliefs of subordinates. 53. After an examination of the judgments of the domestic courts the Commission finds that the primary aim of the applicants' convictions under Article 4 of Law 1363/38 was to protect the religious freedom of the Bairamis family and their neighbours, A. Zounara, G. Antoniadis, A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas. It follows that the measure complained of pursued a legitimate aim under Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention, the protection of the rights and freedoms of the others. 54. The Commission also notes, however, that some of the counts on which the applicants were found guilty involved other members of the armed forces of lower rank. It considers, therefore, that, when convicting the applicants on the particular counts, the domestic courts also aimed at maintaining discipline in the armed forces. It follows that the applicants' convictions for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis, A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas pursued a second legitimate aim under the Convention, namely to maintain order in the armed forces (Eur. Court H.R., Engel and others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 41, para. 98; Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi judgment of 19 December 1994, Series A no. 302, p. 16, para. 32, and p. 19, para. 47). 3. Whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" 55. The applicants argue that the Greek law on proselytism is fundamentally incompatible with the Convention, because of its chilling effect on the right guaranteed under Article 9 (Art. 9) thereof. 56. The applicants further contend that their convictions were not necessary in a democratic society. They consider that the thrust of the Kokkinakis judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is to place the heaviest burden on the State that wishes to justify restrictions on religious freedom. However, the domestic courts have failed to substantiate in their decisions the use of improper means on the part of the applicants on either the airmen or civilians. 57. The applicants argue that it is difficult to imagine a pressing social need capable of restricting the freedom to engage in responsible religious evangelism as exercised by adherents of mainline Christian denominations, such as the Pentecostal Church. As regards their convictions for the proselytism of airmen, the applicants stress that they only had informal discussions with them. Such discussions had not been made a required part of military training, nor were sanctions imposed or threatened to the airmen who did not accept the viewpoint of the applicants or refused to listen to them, nor was any inducement offered. The fact that the discussions were held between a superior and a subordinate could not justify in itself the limitation of the applicants' rights. Most social structures in modern societies are hierarchical and, if States were permitted to criminalise religious discussions between a superior and a subordinate, religious freedom would be seriously undermined. Moreover, the airmen in question were sufficiently mature to die for their country. A fortiori they were sufficiently mature to discuss and decide for themselves religious matters. 58. Furthermore, the applicants argue that the religious discussions in question did not prevent the applicants from discharging their military functions. The religious beliefs of the applicants, not being pacifist, were not in any sense dangerous to military efficiency. The Government have not demonstrated that the presentation of the applicants' faith would necessarily produce military and social anarchy. 59. As regards the facts of each case of alleged proselytism, the applicants stress that G. Antoniadis testified, in respect of the only incident of alleged proselytism identifiable in place and time, that he was approached by the first applicant "after hours". G. Antoniadis's subjective fear was not backed by any subjective evidence. All airmen were able to refuse the applicants' advances without any consequences. N. Kafkas's own testimony, which exonerated the first and third applicants, was to be preferred to that of his father, A. Kafkas, which was hearsay. 60. The applicants point out that A. Zounara was not cross-examined by the defence. In any event, her testimony did not refer to any coercion on the part of the second or third applicants nor did it disclose any intellectual weakness on her part. The difference in social status between the second and third applicants and her cannot form the basis for limiting the Convention rights of the former. Her psychological problems were not the result of proselytism, but of her family break-up. There was no proof that these problems were associated with the second and third applicants' evangelistic activities. In any event, A. Zounara proved to be in control of the situation and, exercising her free will, she severed all contact with the two applicants. 61. Finally, the applicants argue that the imposition of a criminal penalty, even when limited or commuted to a pecuniary fine, constituted a disproportionate interference with their rights under the Convention. 62. The Government contend that, since Article 4 of Law 1363/38 only punishes improper proselytism, it is fully compatible with Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, as interpreted in the Kokkinakis judgment. 63. As regards the particular circumstances of the case, the Government claim that they could be distinguished from those in the Kokkinakis case. First, the applicants were military officers, who were subject to special conditions and had specific "duties" and "responsibilities" within the meaning of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention which could justify wider restrictions on their Convention rights. In particular, because of the applicants' professional status, their views were liable to carry special weight with young persons under their command or persons who were vulnerable and intellectually weak, because of their social status, difficult family circumstances and low level of education. Secondly, the applicants engaged themselves in more than one act of proselytism over a long period of time and were so persistent and systematic that their attempt to change their victims' religious beliefs could be assimilated to an attack. Thirdly, the crime took place in military premises when the applicants and quite often their victims were on duty. 64. The Government submit that the applicants' conviction was necessary in a democratic society because the applicants took advantage of the influence which officers by definition have over ordinary soldiers and of the confidence which young soldiers have in them. The Government refer in this connection to the special relations of dependency which are created in the military forces, as a result of the strict hierarchical structure of the army, and which do not permit the development of a free dialogue on an equal basis between an officer and a subordinate. They rely in this respect on the testimonies of G. Antoniadis, A. Kokkalis, A. Kafkas, N. Kafkas and I. Bairamis. 65. The second and third applicants also took advantage of the psychological problems which her difficult family circumstances had created for A. Zounara, her level of education and the respect she had for military officers. The Government refer in this connection to a statement made by A. Zounara before the investigating judge. 66. The Government, finally, stress that the requirement of proportionality in Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention could not have been breached, since the penalty imposed at first instance had been suspended and the penalty imposed on appeal was first converted into a fine and then suspended. 67. The Commission recalls that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, a certain margin of appreciation is to be left to the Contracting States in assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of an interference with the freedom to manifest one's religion under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, but this margin is subject to European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Convention organs' task is to determine whether the measures taken at national level were justified in principle and proportionate. In order to examine this latter point, the Commission must weigh the requirements of the protection of the rights and liberties of others and, where applicable, the need to maintain order in the armed forces against the conduct of which the applicants stood accused. In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Commission must look at the impugned judicial decisions against the background of the case as a whole (see above-mentioned Kokkinakis judgment, p. 21, para. 47). It must also satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention and, moreover, that they based themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R., Jersild judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298, p. 24, para. 31). 68. The Commission further recalls that the question of the compatibility of the Greek law on proselytism with Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention does not arise for the first time before the Convention organs. In its Kokkinakis judgment the European Court of Human Rights considered that, although the right to attempt to change one's neighbour's beliefs was guaranteed in principle under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, a distinction must be made between bearing Christian witness and improper proselytism; scrutiny of section 4 of Law 1363/38 showed that the relevant criteria adopted by the Greek legislature were reconcilable with the foregoing if and insofar as they were designed only to punish improper proselytism, which the Court did not find it necessary to define in the abstract (abovementioned Kokkinakis judgment, p. 17, para. 31, and p. 21, para. 48). 69. The Commission further notes that the Court of Cassation, in upholding the three applicants' convictions, adopted an approach to the question of the compatibility of the Greek law on proselytism with the Convention which differed from that of the European Court of Human Rights. In particular, the Court of Cassation failed to distinguish between the use of proper and improper means and considered that it was permitted to criminalise every attempt to change one's neighbour's beliefs. Thus, the Court of Cassation found the Greek law on proselytism to be compatible with Article 9 (Art. 9) of Convention and the equivalent provision of the Greek Constitution on the ground that "(the law on proselytism) does not purport to criminalise religious beliefs, but only the attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of someone else with the aim of changing them; such an attempt is fully inconsistent with religious freedom which creates an obligation to respect the religious beliefs of every person of a different religious persuasion" (cf. judgment of the Court of Cassation of 30 July 1993, paras. 39-41, issued after the Kokkinakis judgment of the European Court of Human Rights). 70. The Commission notes that the difference in the approach of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Cassation concerns a fundamental aspect of the interpretation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, which could have important consequences for the applicants' case. It considers, therefore, that particular care is called for when examining whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference with the applicants' freedom to manifest their religion under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention were relevant and sufficient and whether the means employed were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 71. The Commission will first examine the necessity in a democratic society of the conviction of the second applicant for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours and the conviction of the second and third applicants for the proselytism of A. Zounara. Then it will examine the necessity of the conviction of the first and second applicants for the proselytism of airman G. Antoniadis and of the first and third applicants for the proselytism of airmen A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas. i. The conviction of the second applicant for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours and the conviction of the second and third applicants for the proselytism of A. Zounara 72. The Commission recalls that the particular charges were heard by the military courts because the second and third applicants were military officers. However, the persons whom the two applicants were accused of proselytising, i.e. the Bairamis family, their neighbours and A. Zounara, were not members of the armed forces and the Commission considers that in this respect the two applicants' case is not to be distinguished from that of Kokkinakis. 73. The Commission further considers that the two applicants' case is similar to that of Kokkinakis, in that the domestic courts established their liability on the particular counts by merely reproducing the wording of Article 4 of Law 1363/38. The domestic courts did not sufficiently specify in what way the two applicants had attempted to convince the Bairamis family, their neighbours and A. Zounara by improper means. None of the facts they set out in their decisions, including the two applicants' professional status, the repetition of the acts in the case of A. Zounara and the latter's low level of education, warrants such a conclusion. 74. The Commission, therefore, considers that it has not been shown that the second and third applicants' conviction on the particular counts was justified in the circumstances of the case by a pressing social need. It follows that the contested measure was not "necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others", which is the only legitimate aim which it could pursue, since the counts under examination did not involve other members of the armed forces of lower rank. CONCLUSION 75. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the second applicant was convicted for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours. 76. The Commission concludes, by 24 votes to 5, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the second and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Zounara. ii. The conviction of the first and second applicants for the proselytism of airman G. Antoniadis, the conviction of the first and third applicants for the proselytism of airmen A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas 77. The Commission recalls that the particular charges did not involve civilians but three airmen serving in the applicants' unit. The applicants tried to persuade the three airmen to change their religious beliefs and this fact, together with the applicants' status as military officers and the persistency of their efforts, led the domestic courts to conclude that the applicants were guilty of proselytism. The respondent Government submit that these factors, among others, clearly distinguish the applicants' case from that of Kokkinakis. The Commission is, therefore, called upon to examine whether the facts relied on by the domestic courts justify the conclusion that the applicants used improper means to change the religious beliefs of the airmen in question. 78. The Commission notes, on the one hand, that the three airmen were not obliged to undergo any form of instruction in the beliefs of a church other than their own as part of their military training. Moreover, there is no indication that the applicants used threats or inducements in their attempts to convince the three airmen to change their religious beliefs. On the other hand, the Commission considers that the special character of the relationship between a superior and a subordinate in the army, which differs from other hierarchical relations, renders the subordinate more susceptible to influence in a variety of matters, including religious beliefs. 79. It was in order to ensure that the three airmen's religious beliefs were respected by persons who could take advantage of that special relationship that the military courts convicted the applicants. The Commission notes, moreover, that, as observed by the military courts, the applicants and the airmen in question served in the same unit and that the applicants' attempts to persuade the airmen to change their religious beliefs extended over rather long periods of time. Finally, the Commission does not disregard the fact that the applicants received suspended sentences consisting of fines. 80. On the basis of all the above and taking into consideration the domestic authorities' margin of appreciation, the Commission finds that the applicants' conviction on the particular counts could be regarded as justified in the circumstances of the case by a pressing social need and that the contested measure was not disproportionate to one of the legitimate aims pursued, "the protection of the rights and freedoms of the others". It follows that the contested measure was "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention. CONCLUSION 81. The Commission concludes, by 28 votes to 1, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the first and second applicants were convicted for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis and the first and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis. 82. The Commission concludes, by 23 votes to 6, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the first applicant and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of N. Kafkas. D. As regards Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention 83. Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows: "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. ..." 84. The applicants argue that Article 4 of Law 1363/38 is not lex certa. The Government disagree. Both parties refer to their relevant submissions under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention. 85. The Commission recalls that Article 7 (Art. 7) requires that an offence must be clearly defined in law. This condition is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts' interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him liable (Eur. Court H.R., Kokkinakis judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260 A p. 22, para. 52). 86. The Commission has already considered that the wording of Article 4 of Law 1363/38, as supplemented by a body of settled case- law, enabled the applicants to regulate their conduct in the matter (see para. 50). It follows that there was no breach of Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention. CONCLUSION 87. The Commission concludes, by 28 votes to 1, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention. E. As regards Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention 88. Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ... 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." 89. The applicants argue that their conviction amounted to an interference in the exercise of their right to freedom of expression which cannot be justified under Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention. The Government submit that the interference was justified. Both parties refer to their relevant submissions under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention. 90. The Commission considers that, when exercise of the right to freedom of expression consists in the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief in worship, teaching or observance, it is primarily the right guaranteed by Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention which is applicable. It follows that no separate issue arises under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. CONCLUSION 91. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that no separate issue arises under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. F. As regards Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention 92. Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides as follows: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." 93. The Commission has, on the one hand, concluded that there has been a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the second applicant was convicted for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours and the second and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Zounara. It considers, therefore, that no separate issue arises under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention in respect of these convictions. 94. On the other hand, the Commission has concluded that there has been no violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar the first and second applicants were convicted for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis and the first and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas. As a result, it cannot be a priori excluded that a separate issue may arise under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9). 95. However, the Commission notes that, when the applicants first raised their complaint about discrimination in the enjoyment of their right to freedom of religion in their application forms, they did not provide any particulars. Moreover, this complaint was not pursued in the applicants' written observations. As a result, the Commission considers that, in the absence of any substantiation, there has been no violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9) insofar as the first and second applicants were convicted for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis and the first and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas. CONCLUSION 96. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case no separate issue arises under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9) insofar as the second applicant was convicted for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours and the second and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Zounara. 97. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9) insofar as the first and second applicants were convicted for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis and the first and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas. G. Recapitulation 98. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the second applicant was convicted for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours (para. 75). 99. The Commission concludes, by 24 votes to 5, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the second and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Zounara (para. 76). 100. The Commission concludes, by 28 votes to 1, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the first and second applicants were convicted for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis and the first and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis (para. 81). 101. The Commission concludes, by 23 votes to 6, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention insofar as the first applicant and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of N. Kafkas (para. 82). 102. The Commission concludes, by 28 votes to 1, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention (para. 87). 103. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that no separate issue arises under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention (para. 91). 104. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case no separate issue arises under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9) insofar as the second applicant was convicted for the proselytism of the Bairamis family and their neighbours and the second and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Zounara (para. 96). 105. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9) insofar as the first and second applicants were convicted for the proselytism of G. Antoniadis and the first and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of A. Kokkalis and N. Kafkas (para. 97). H.C. KRÜGER S. TRECHSEL Secretary President to the Commission of the Commission (Or. English) PARTIALLY CONCURRING AND PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY In Kokkinakis v. Greece (Series A, Vol. 260) both the Commission and the Court were of the majority view that Section 4 of Law no. 1363/1938 was supplemented by a body of published, settled case-law sufficient to enable the applicant in that case to regulate his conduct. Accordingly, the requirement under Article 9 (2) that the interference be "prescribed by law" and the requirements of Article 7 where met in that case. Since that judgment of 25 May 1993 the scope of Greek law prohibiting proselytism has become considerably more obscure. In its judgment of 30 July 1993 in the present applicants' case the Court of Cassation found that the law on proselytism criminalises attempts to intrude on the religious beliefs of another with the aim of changing them contrary to the obligation to respect the religious beliefs of every person of a different religious persuasion. In marked contrast to the understanding of the Commission and Court at the time of the Kokkinakis case which was that Section 4 was "designed only to punish improper proselytism" (para. 48 of the judgment), the Court of Cassation has apparently accepted that simple statements of belief which nevertheless "intrude" on another's beliefs are punishable. It is noteworthy that the Court of Cassation upheld the reasoning of the first instance and appeals courts which either failed entirely to explain what was improper or exploitative about the conversations in question (for example, in relation to the first applicant's conviction for proselytising G. Antoniadis) or described the conduct as "importunate" without indicating the circumstances of time and place or how the discussions had been initiated. Secondly, no precedent has been cited concerning the application of the law to military officers who do not hold pacifist convictions. It seems clear that young men liable for military service, and possibly action, will be of a certain maturity. It also seems clear that on the one hand such young men may wish to engage in discussions on fundamental questions concerning matters of religious belief, as witness the practice in many if not all countries of providing army chaplains, but that on the other hand senior officers could abuse their power if entitled to initiate such discussions, at least during duty hours. However, there appears to be no regulation in Greek law of the circumstances, if any, in which superior officers may engage in such discussions with their juniors. The applicants stress that G. Antoniadis testified, in respect of the only incident of alleged proselytism identifiable in place and time, that he was approached by the first applicant "after hours" (see decision on admissibility). In the absence of specific regulation or precedents governing potentially exploitative conduct by superior officers it cannot be said that Section 4 of Law no. 1383/1938 was sufficiently clear to enable the applicants to know in advance that their discussions could be punishable. For these reasons I consider that neither the requirement under Article 9 (2) that the interference be "prescribed by law" nor the requirements of Article 7 were met in the present case. There have therefore been violations of Articles 7 and 9 in relation to all the sentences imposed. (Or. English) PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. H.G. SCHERMERS, C.L. ROZAKIS, M.A. NOWICKI, B. CONFORTI AND N. BRATZA Unfortunately, we are not able to agree with the conclusion of majority of the Commission concerning the compatibility with Article 9 of the Convention of the conviction of the first and third applicants for the proselytism of N. Kafkas. We note in this respect that, in order to convict the two applicants on the particular count, the domestic courts relied, inter alia, on the hierarchical links which the two applicants had with N. Kafkas while he was serving in the armed forces. However, N. Kafkas, as opposed to the other airmen, eventually adopted the applicants' religious beliefs. Having failed to appear before the first instance court, when N. Kafkas appeared before the appeal court, he testified that he had acceded to the Pentecostal Church of his own free will and that the two applicants had never attempted to influence him. We consider that such testimony should carry special weight in proselytism cases. However, it cannot be excluded that the national courts, after a careful evaluation of all the evidence before them, may reach the conclusion that the conversion of the person concerned was not the result of his own free will but that improper means were indeed used. In principle, the Convention organs should pay due regard to such a finding by a national court which has had the benefit of hearing all the witnesses of the case. However, we note that in the applicants' case the decisions of the military courts, which the Court of Cassation upheld, did not contain any evaluation of the evidence. Moreover, the appeal court did not hear A. Kafkas, who was the principal prosecution witness on the particular counts. Instead it chose to rely on the witness's statement to the investigating judge and his testimony before the first instance court to the effect that his son, N. Kafkas, had been converted to the Pentecostal Church during his military service under the influence of the two applicants who were superior officers. We note, however, that A. Kafkas's testimony was based on what he claimed to have heard from N. Kafkas and others. We also note that N. Kafkas appeared before the appeal court in order to contradict his father, while A. Kafkas failed to identify his other sources. The second prosecution witness, I. Stamoulis, merely reported what he had heard from A. Kafkas. It follows that the two applicants' conviction for the proselytism of N. Kafkas was based on evidence which was not sufficiently tested by the national courts. In these circumstances, we cannot consider that it has been established that N. Kafkas's conversion was the result of undue influence exercised by the two applicants on N. Kafkas during his military service. The other considerations which the domestic courts invoked in their decisions were a mere repetition of the wording of Article 4 of Law 1363/1938. In our view, it follows that the contested measure was not "necessary in a democratic society" for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or the maintenance of order in the armed forces. This is why we voted in favour of a violation of Article 9 insofar as the first and third applicants were convicted for the proselytism of N. Kafkas. (Or. French) PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. F. MARTINEZ JOINED BY Mrs. G.H. THUNE AND MM. E. BUSUTTIL, J.-C. GEUS AND A. PERENIC Je partage entièrement l'avis de la Commission sur tous les points où il n'aboutit pas à des constats de violations de la Convention. Non sans quelques hésitations, je pourrais accepter une violation de l'article 9 en ce qui concerne la famille Bairamis et leurs voisins ; mais pas du tout pour ce qui est de Mme Zounara. Le cas Zounara Je ne suis pas d'accord avec la majorité. Celle-ci justifie la violation par deux arguments : 1. Mme Zounara n'est pas un membre des forces armées ; 2. Les juridictions internes se seraient limitées à reproduire le texte de l'article 4 de la loi 1363/1968 et n'expliquent pas les moyens par lesquels les requérants ont essayé de convaincre Mme Zounara. Même si Mme Zounara n'est pas sous les ordres militaires des requérants, ceux-ci ont employé des manoeuvres tortueuses bien expliquées par les juridictions internes. Je me réfère au paragraphe 27 du rapport de la Commission où il y a une traduction de l'arrêt relatif au deuxième requérant. J'y lis ceci : "... he tried persistently to convince A. Zounara that the followers of the Pentecostal Church bore marks given to them by God, that they could prophesy the future, that A. Zounara and her children were possessed by the devil, that the devil was fighting to keep control over her, that A. Zounara worshipped idols and daemons and that the Pentecostal church was the holder of the truth; the accused also urged A. Zounara in a pressing manner to get baptised and become a member of the Pentecostal Church." Toujours au paragraphe 27 du rapport de la Commission, on peut lire pour le troisième requérant : "... skilfully taking advantage of her inexperience in religious matters and her intellectual weakness, which resulted from her low level of education, the accused tried importunately to persuade A. Zounara to be baptised and become a member of the sect of the Pentecostal Church telling her constantly that he bore signs given to him by God, that he could tell the future and that she and her children were possessed; the accused intended to undermine A. Zounara's faith in Orthodoxy and convert her to the sect of the Pentecostal Church." A mon avis, il résulte clairement des citations ci-dessus que les tribunaux internes ne se sont pas bornés à recopier les termes du texte de loi applicable mais qu'ils ont, au contraire, détaillé les agissements dolosifs reprochés aux requérants.